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CONTRACT PROBLEMS IN U.S.JAPANESE
JOINT VENTURES
BY DAN FENNO HENDERSON*
U.S.-Japanese joint ventures1 are by far the most important form of
direct foreign investment2 in Japan. For unlike most advanced govern-
ments elsewhere in the world,' Japanese officialdom has, with precious
few exceptions,4 denied validation under the Law Concerning Foreign
Investment' to all enterprises wholly-owned or even majority-owned by
* Professor of Law and Director, Asian Law Program, University of Washington.
The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Teisuke Akamatsu, Esquire,
of the Tokyo Bar in the preparation of this article.
'Although the term "U.S.-Japanese joint venture corporation!' might be applied to
corporate ventures in which all the shareholders are nationals of the place of in-
corporation but the activities are elsewhere (or where all or most of the activities
of a Japanese corporation are in the United States, or vice versa), we use the term
here, as it is used in Japanese parlance, to mean a Japanese corporation with operations
in Japan and in which the major shareholders include both Japanese and U.S. firms.
For further general discussions of definitions, see Comment, International Joint Ven-
ture Corporation: Drafting of Control Arrangements, 1963 DuIKE L. J. 516; FrmE-
MANN & KALMANOFF, JOINT INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS VENTURES 5 (1961).
For joint ventures generally in the United States, see Jaeger, Joint Ventures:
Origits, Nature and Development and Joint Ventures: Membership, Types, and
Termination, 9 AM. U.L. REv. 1 and 111 (1960); Adkins, Gilpatrick & Abraham,
Corporate Joint Ventures it; Operation, 14 Bus. LAw 285 (1959) ; Berle, Developments
in the Pattern of Corporate Joint Enterprise, 14 Bus. LAw 309 (1959); Broden &
Scanlan, The Legal Status of Joint Venture Corporations, 11 VAND. L. RFv. 673
(1958); Taubman, Wzat Constitutes a Joint Venture, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 640 (1956);
Dambach, Corporations: Survival of Joint Adventure Agreements After Incorpora-
tion, 3 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 94 (1955); Nichols, Joint Ventures, 36 VA. L. REv. 425
(1950); and Mechem, The Law of Joint Adventures, 15 MINN. L. REv. 644 (1931).2 Note, however, that generally Japanese policy has discouraged all direct invest-
ment (whether joint venture or wholly owned) in favor of separating the induction
of technology and capital, and excluding foreign management. Thus, Japanese policy
has encouraged straight licensing to obtain foreign technology and loans or portfolio
investment to obtain capital from abroad. See Introduction p. 405 supra.
3 See figures as of 1957 in FRImmANx & KALmANoFF, op. cit. supra note 1, at 18-19.
About a fourth of the total investments in all areas involved less than 95 percent
United States ownership; this figure may be taken as an indication of the extent
of joint ventures in United States direct foreign investments. Most of this joint
investment (20 percent, out of the total of 25 percent) was in the category of
50-95 percent United States ownership. Minority positions for the United States
investors (in effect from 25 percent to 50 percent ownership) are represented only
to a small extent. The category of "95 percent or more ownership," which
accounts for three-fourths of the total, may be taken to represent wholly United
States-owned investments.
Note, however, the trends since 1957 would probably show a greater use by U.S.
firms of joint ventures abroad.
'Out of a total of 183 international joint venture companies validated under the
Law Concerning Foreign Investment (see note 5 infra) in Japan from 1950 to Oct.
1963, in only 25 did the foreign investor have a majority and most of these were
prewar positions or, in any event, approved before the occupation ended, April 1952.
There were also twenty-three fifty-fifty joint ventures. JiiKAGAKU K6GY5 TSfISHIN-
SHA, GAIKOKU GIJUTSU D5NYfl YORAN (Guide to induction of foreign technology) 49
(1964).
G Gaishi ni kansuru huritsu (Law No. 163, 1950) [hereafter cited FIL], in 5 EHS
No. 5410.
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foreigners. Furthermore, it was basic Japanese policy not to validate
even a minority equity in a Japanese enterprise unless the foreigner
possessed essential technology which he would not make available to
Japanese industry by straight patent or know-how licensing arrange-
ments. Since before July 1963 validation only meant the right to
repatriate capital and earnings in foreign currency, many foreign firms
had chosen to forego validation and operate a wholly-owned or ma-
jority-owned Japanese corporation for yen only, but even this
opportunity for an unapproved and underprivileged majority holding
was foreclosed on July 1, 1963, when the Japanese Government de-
clared7 that the so-called "yen operation" could no longer be estab-
lished without official validation.'
With only minority positions possible, it is not surprising that
foreign investors have attempted to mitigate the weaknesses of their
corporate position by special corporate control provisions inserted in
preincorporation joint venture contracts' with the Japanese partner.
It is mainly this range of contract problems raised in the interstices of
Japanese contract, corporate, and administrative law which will be
explored below."0 The discussion will be limited to the problems as
6 All yen operations established before July 1, 1963, when further yen operations
were forbidden, were ordered to report to the Minister of Finance by January 31,
1964, and as a result of these reports it was found that there were some 289 yen cor-
porations and 273 foreign corporate branches in Japan, but only 120 of these yen
corporations were manufacturing companies; another 109 were sales companies,
mostly of minor scope. The total capital of all (289) was estimated at $140,000,000
book value. TRADE BULLETIN CORP. (TOKYO), THE APRIL 1964 SUPPLEMENT TO
FOREIGN INVESTMENT, FOREIGN EXCHANGE CONTROL AND IMPORT CONTROL SYSTEM
(Book II) 32-33 (Social and Economic Laws of Japan series, 1964).
7 The 1963 change took place as an amendment to the Cabinet Order Concerning
Exceptions, etc., to Standards of Validation Based on the Law Concerning Foreign
Investment (Gaishi nti kansuru horitsu no kitei ni vzotomuku ninka no kijun no
tokurei-t5 ni kansuru seirei) (Cabinet Order No. 221, July 1, 1952) in 5 EHS No.
5470. The amending order was Cabinet Order No. 228, June 29, 1963, effective July 1,
1963.
8 But note that history was made on August 11, 1964, when the Japanese Govern-
ment validated the first 100% (Y200,000,000) equity in a Japanese corporation since
1950. Asahi Shimbun (Asahi Newspaper), Aug. 12, 1964, p. 2.
The foreign investor was British United Shoe Machinery. But the import of its
product was already freely allowed. So the validation is doubtless a special case.
9 Practically nothing has been written on U.S.-Japanese joint venture contracts
either in Japanese or English. On the how-to-do-it level see GAIKOKU KAWASE B6EKI
KENKYUIKAI, GAIKOKUJIN NO NIHON NI OKERU GOBENGAISHA SETSURITSU KEIYAKU
NI TSUITE (Concerning contracts establishing foreigners' joint venture corporations in
Japan) (1963). See also Ji1KAGAKU K6GY6 TSfiSHINSHA, op. cit. supra note 4, at 367,
for a complete list of foreign stock equities in joint venture corporations validated
under the FIL.
10 For general aspects see Bradshaw, Joint Ventures in Japan, 38 WASH. L. REv. 58
(1963) ; for general contract drafting problems see Comment, supra note 1; for the
leading work on U.S. joint ventures generally in various countries see FRIEDMANN &
KALMANOFF, JOINT INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS VENTURES (1961); also see BOULTON,
BUSINESS CONSORTIA 52-62 (1961), for a detailed discussion on "documenting the
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they appear to the drafting lawyer in the initial contracting phase 1
although, of course, in drafting the lawyers look prospectively to
performance and enforceability for reference, meaning, deterrence,
and, only in the most marginal situations, to litigation. Emphatically,
the implication must be avoided that litigated results can be a major
guide in this peculiarly complex and creative type of private law
making. Rather, the legal doctrine and enforcement apparatus of the
law function more as aids to understanding and clarity of communi-
cation, as voluntary guides to performance, or possibly as moral deter-
rents to breach. The efficacy of law in the international private
contracting process is, of course, premised on good faith and mutual
purpose-things which cannot be legally compelled. Thus, litigation
means little more than salvage, not specific performance or even
adequate compensation even though the Japanese legal system has
tolerable doctrines in this area. U.S. domestic experience with its
affirmative enforcement of partnership or close corporate relations
generally bears this proposition out, 2 but there are other factors
peculiar to U.S.-Japanese transactions which amplify this basic
premise. Foremost among these peculiarities is the Japanese business-
man's attitude toward contracts." In his domestic business affairs he
uses detailed formal contracts relatively little and litigation" even less,
depending more on traditional organizational patterns, social hierarchy,
and authority, which always have been the dominant features of per-
haps the world's most socially (not legally) organized society. The
contracts employed in intercorporate business arrangements tend to
be brief memorandums establishing flexible, adjustable relationships
consortium" which coincides rather closely to our problem of drafting joint venture
contracts; and CHESHIRE, INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS (1948).
Since joint venture corporations are usually close corporations the discussion in
I O'NwAL, CLOSE CORORATONS 77-81 (1958), will be useful; also TAUmAN, THE
JoINT VENTURE AND TAx CLASSIFICATION (1957).
" It seems to be an almost unique professional privilege of U.S. lawyers to be
consulted by businessmen during the contracting process. For the little use made of
lawyers in contract matters in Europe, see van Hecke, A Civilian Looks at the
Common-Law Lawyer in PARKER SCHOOL, INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 5, 8 (Reese ed.
1962) ; for England, see G. W. Keeton, The Future of the Legal Profession in Eng-
land, 25 U. CiNc. L. REv. 279, 285 (1956) ; and for Japan, see Hattori, The Legal
Profession: Its Historical Development and Present State, in LAW IN JAPAN (von
Mehren ed. 1963).
12 See Chayes, Madame Wagner and the Close Corporation, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1532
(1960).
1' Note what happened in a jury trial on an oral contract claim brought against a
Japanese corporation by a Nisei broker in the New York federal courts. Masuda v.
Kawasaki Dockyard Co., 328 F2d 662, 664 (2d Cir. 1964).
1" The Japanese practice of using extralegal dispute settlement techniques is noted
in Nippon Hod6 Co. v. United States, 285 F.2d 766, 768 (Ct. Cf. 1961).
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which are governed by discussions and amicable compromises in case of
disputes. More will be said on this flexible approach to contracting
later.15
A second point which de-emphasizes legalities of the U.S.-Japanese
joint venture is the inefficacy of transnational litigation generally.
This is not just the usual problem of judicial administration-expense,
time, and inept procedures and remedies; transnational lawsuits gen-
erally reach an exquisite degree of disutility by the combination of
ambiguous conflicts rules, unenforceable prorogation and choice-of-law
clauses16 (meaning multiple law potentially applicable), translation
and foreign law proof problems, and a paucity of legal experts.' Saving
for another time the difficulties of assuring that any single law will
actually turn out to govern bilateral litigation, it will be assumed for
the purpose of discussion that Japanese law governs because normally
it is stipulated (and the parties think it governs, which for reasons
mentioned above is important), because the operation is in Japan, and
because usually neither the joint venture corporation nor the Japanese
partner are suable elsewhere.'
THE SCHEME OF JAPANESE LAW APPLICABLE
TO JOINT VENTURE CONTRACTS
The first elemental question for the foreign lawyer is: where in the
Japanese codes is the law of contracts 9 relevant to joint ventures to be
15 See text, Frustration and Modification, at notes 125-36 infra.
16 See generally Lenhoff, The Parties' Choice of a Forum: "Prorogation Agree-
ments," 15 RUTGERS L. REV. 414 (1961); McCartney, The Use of Choice-of-Law
Clauses in International Commercial Contracts, 6 WAYNE L. REV. 340 (1959-1960) ;
Maw, Conflicts Avoidance in International Contracts, in PARKER SCHOOL, op. Cit. supra
note 11, at 23.
17 Henderson, The Roles of Lawyers in U.S.-Japanese Business Transactions, 38
WASH. L. REV. 1 (1963).
1s But, of course, one or the other can always bring suit elsewhere and at least test
the jurisdictional points, and therein lies the basic ambiguity. On matters of jurisdic-
tion and "competence," see EHRENZWEIG, IKEHARA & JENSEN, AMERICAN-JAPANESE
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 26 (1964).
19 Several secondary Japanese language works on contracts have appeared in
recent years-texts, commentaries, collections of essays and forms. See e.g., 1
WAGATSUMA, MIMP6 K6GI (Lectures on the Civil Code) 196 (1963) on general
provisions, including juristic acts, and volumes 4, 5 (1), (2), and (3) (1962) on
obligations; KEIYAKUH6 TAIKEI (Compendium [essays] on Contract Law) (1963), a
six-volume memorial collection of essays by many scholars on various contract law
topics, dedicated to Professors Matsuzaka, Nishimura, Funabashi, Yagi, and Ishimoto;
HIRONAKA, KEIYAKUHO KENKYU (Studies on contract law) (1958) ; WAGATSUMA &
ARIzumI,, 3 KOmMENTARU, SAIKENH5 (Commentairies, obligation law) (1951), an
article-by-article commentary on the code sections with case citations; 1 HANREI
KOIMMENTARU (Case commentary) (Wagatsuma ed. 1963) is on the General Pro-
visions (s6soku) of the Civil Code [the volumes on obligations are not out yet];
ONO & IMANISHI, KEIYAKU ZENSHO (Complete collection on contracts) (1962), a
collection of contract forms plus a commentary.
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found? Because this law is interwoven into both the Civil Code and
the Commercial Code along with several special laws, it is useful to
approach the law in the German fashion as the Japanese lawyer would.
He sees the codes as deductively systematic: the Civil Code is the
source of general principle, perhaps analogous in this sense to the
historical position of the common law in our system. On contracts,
Civil Code Book I (articles 3-20, 90-137) covers Juristic Acts (k6ritsu
kii) and Capacity (ndryoku) which, so far as it applies to contracts,
corresponds roughly to our various problems of mutual assent, espe-
cially when considered with Book III (articles 399-696) on Obligations
(saiken), particularly articles 399-548 on the formation and effect of
contracts generally, and articles 549-696 covering thirteen specific types
of contracts. Then a special and separate Commercial Code (Book III)
elaborates the law governing any Commercial Transaction (skiki)
including all transactions of Business Enterprises (kigyj) ° which are
the main objects to which the Commercial Code is applicable. To de-
termine the applicability of the Commercial Code, the first question
is whether the joint venture contract is such a commercial transaction"
between such enterprises. It clearly is, because any Japanese corpora-
tion is a Trader (sl6nin), and all transactions of a trader which are
related to his business are commercial transactions under the Com-
mercial Code, whether the other party is a trader or not.2 Commercial
Code article 1 then provides for the priority of the Commercial Code
over commercial transactions: the code shall govern, but if it contains
no applicable provisions, the customary law shall apply, and if there
is no applicable customary law, the Civil Code shall apply.
The formation of a contract is generally determined by the Civil
20 See generally, NIsrEIAxRA, SH6K6 H6 (Law of commercial transactions) 1-2 (29
H6R1TSUGAKU ZENsHf ed. 1960) for the dominant theory that the objects of the
Commercial Code are kigyo.
21 The definitions of various kinds of commercial transactions are found in Com-
MERCIA. CODE arts. 501, 502, and 503. For the definition of a trader as mentioned in
art. 503(1), see COMMERCrLA CODE arts. 4, 52, and 523 and Limited Company Law
(Yogengaishaho) arts. 1 and 2 (Law No. 74, 1938).
22 As a consequence of several provisions (Coarm=crAl. CODE arts. 3, 4, 52, 501, 502,
503, 523 and Limited Company Law arts. 1 and 2), the Commercial Code applies to
any business-related transaction of a company, whether stock-type or not, so long as
it is incorporated in accordance with the provisions of the Commercial Code (Book II)
or the Limited Company Law. The Commercial Code will always apply to any
transactions effected in Japan by a foreign company with a Japanese company,
whether it is recognized by Japanese law as a trader or not. This is because if the
Japanese company is a trader and if the transaction is related to his business, as is
generally the case (i.e., whenever it is in pursuit of benefit in the broadest sense), the
Commercial Code always applies to the other party. CommacLAz CODE arts. 3(1) and
503.
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Code provisions" and the basic requirement to form a contract is
mutual assent (i.e., offer and acceptance). Such questions as capacity,
fraud, mistake, duress, or illegality are considered to bear only upon
the effect of the contract after mutual assent.24 There are no general
requirements of consideration25 or writing.2" Since U.S.-Japanese joint
venture contracts are always written embodiments of mutual bilateral
promises duly signed, generally there would be no formation problems
even under our law.
The general approach of the rest of the Civil Code (i.e., Book III) is
to elaborate general rules for obligations and particularly rules for
thirteen kinds of Typical Contracts (tenkei keiyaku), none of which
includes a joint venture contract as such, but the typical Partnership
Contract (kumiai keiyaku) would undoubtedly apply to these joint
ventures before incorporation and also, when appropriate, after incor-
poration, as shall be seen later. Of course, the general provisions in
Civil Code Book I and other general provisions, such as those on
obligations and contracts, Book III articles 399-548, are applicable to
all contracts29 including joint ventures. In a proper case some of the
23 CIVIL CODE arts. 521-528. Also, on offer and acceptance see COMMERCIAL CODE
arts. 507, 508, and 509.
24 These questions are generally covered by Book I (General Provisions) of the
Civil Code. The relevant provisions are arts. 3-20 on Capacity and 90-137 on Juristic
Act (horitsu koi). See COMMERCIAL CODE art. 504 on representation ("agency").
5(1) WAGATSUMA, MIMPO K6GI (Lectures on the Civil Codes) 79 (1962) ; SUEICAWA,
KEIYAKUIIH6 (Contract law) 20 (1958).
25 Of course, there is no direct Japanese case authority for the proposition that
consideration is not required. But see IZAWA, BEIOICU SH6GY6 SH6KENH6 (U.S.
law on commercial papers) 244 (1955) and the discussion at note 41 infra.
26 There are exceptional contracts regulated by special statutes which specifically
require that the contract be in writing. E.g., tenancy contracts, Farm Land Law
(Nchih5) art. 25 (Law No. 229, 1952) ; contracts for construction work, Construc-
tion Industry Law (Kensetsugy5h5) art. 19 (Law No. 100, 1949). Compare, share
subscriptions (COMMERCIAL CODE art. 175) ; bond subscriptions (COMMERCIAL CODE
art. 301 (1) ; and prorogration clauses in domestic suits (CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art.
25), all of which require written documents related to contracts for regulatory law
purposes, but in Japanese legal conception failure to comply with these requirements
of writing only has regulatory significance and does not invalidate the respective oral
contracts or defeat an action on them for damages.
27 Note that we have a rule derived from agency in some states, however, that
mutual bilateral promises alone will not support an irrevocable proxy. E.g., Johnson v.
Spartanburg County Fair Ass'n., 210 S.C. 56, 41 S.E.2d 599 (1947). But see notes
96-98 infra.
28 The types are: gift (arts. 549-54) ; sale (arts. 555-85) ; exchange (art. 586)
loan for consumption (arts. 587-92) ; loan for use (arts. 593-600) : lease (arts. 601-
22) ; employment (or service) (arts. 623-31) ; contract for work (arts. 632-42);
mandate (arts. 643-56) ; bailment (arts. 657-60) ; partnership (arts. 667-88) ; life
annuity (arts. 689-94) ; and compromise (arts. 695-96). Also see discussion at note 31
infra.
29 For the Japanese theory of Mixed Contracts (kongo keiyaku) and Atypical
Contracts (hitenkei keiyaku), see 5(3) WAGATSUMA, MI.sPo K6GI (Lectures on the
Civil Code) 883 (1962) ; and for judicial handling of atypical contracts see Arimatsu
v. Furukawa, 22 Daishin-in minji hanketsuroku [hereafter cited Minroku] 1450 (Great
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specific provisions on other typical contracts may be applied by
Analogous Application (ruisui tekiyj) or Mutatis Mutandis (junyj),
which are techniques found in Japanese theories of statutory construc-
tion."° Also, there are a number of special laws, supplementary to the
Codes, affecting certain contracts81 or certain aspects of contracts
generally.
The exact legal equivalent of our joint venture concept does not seem
to exist in Japanese contract law.82 But, much as in our system,"3 the
joint venture contract would be treated as a Japanese-type partnership
subject to the rules of a typical partnership contract"' since it con-
templates all the elements of a Japanese partnership: (1) an agree-
ment; (2) Group Organization (dantai); and (3) joint assets."5 The
important thing to be remembered, however, is that in Japanese legal
concepts the "joint venturers" stand in several relationships to each
other when moving from the simple contract to promotion of the new
Ct. of Cassation, Sept. 16, 1916) (contract to make a gift of property held to be
atypical as distinguished from a gift contract in the Civil Code) ; Kawachi Bank v.
Matsumura, 10 Kaky-i saibansho minji hanreishfi [hereafter cited Kakyfi minshfi] 373(Osaka Dist. Ct., Feb. 23, 1959) [mixed contract: consuming bailment contract(CnVL CODE art. 666), plus mandate contract (CML CODE arts. 643-56)].
30 Early Japanese courts confused the use of junyd and rui.md tekiya. Morikawa v.
Mori, 22 Minroku 1663 (Great Ct. of Cassation, Aug. 22, 1916), where mutatis
inutandis (junyd) is used like the word analogous (ruimi tekiy6). However, recently
scholars and courts have generally agreed that junyd is a statutory technique and must
be provided in the law, whereas ruisui tekiyo is a method of legal reasoning employed
in decisions by the courts on their own. Nagamoto and Takeshita v. Fukuhisa, 8 Saik6
saibansho minji hanreishii [hereafter cited Minshi!] 1505 (Sup. Ct., Aug. 20, 1954).
See I WAGATSUMA, op. cit. supra note 19, at 24.
31 Among the special statutes recognizing atypical contracts are Law Concerning
Fidelity Guaranty (Mimoto hosho ni kansurut haritsu) (Law No. 42, 1933) in 2 EHS
No. 2124; Land Lease Law (Shakuchihj) (Law No. 49, 1921) in 2 EHS No. 2130;
House Lease Law (Shakuyahki) (Law No. 50, 1921) in 2 EHS No. 2131; and Labor
Standards Law (Rd7 kijunho) arts. 13-28 (Law No. 49, 1947) in 8 EHS No. 8040
(as to labor contracts).
The Commercial Code also provides a number of types of contracts of a commercial
nature such as contracts of account current (arts. 529-34), contracts of undisclosed
association (arts. 535-42), etc. The Code applies to all contracts of a commercial
nature, whether typical or atypical.
S2 The phrase gtbengaisha (joint venture company), though popular recently in
Japanese parlance, is not a legal term. It does not appear in the statutes, and quaere
whether it has not come into use only recently with reference to the precise inter-
national problems we are discussing. See JfiKAGAKU IX6GY6 TSiISHINSHA, op. cit. supra
note 4, at 45.
83 On this point in the United States, see HENN, CoaRoRATnONs 64 (1961):
Generally, joint ventures are governed by some of the principles of partnership
law, with some differences resulting from the more limited extent of the business
undertaken by the joint venture. The authority of the adventurer to bind the others
is more limited, and there is sometimes said to be no general agency.84 CnL CODE arts. 667-88.
8 5(3) WAGATSUMA, op. cit. supra note 29, at 772. Ujiya v. Ishizuka, 4 Kakyd
minshii 195, 213 (Osaka Dist. Ct., Feb. 17, 1953), where the court found a promoter-
partnership, organized at first by seven promoters in order to incorporate, but later
reduced to two partners after the others withdrew and the incorporation failed.
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corporation and finally to an operative corporation in which they are
shareholders and officers. First, the U.S. and Japanese firms are
legally Japanese partners by virtue of the joint venture contract. When
they set about organizing the corporation, they must assemble seven
promoters"6 and Japanese jurisprudence subjects these promoters to
the typical partnership contract rules with regard to their activities in
establishing a new corporation. s7 Thus, at this stage, if both joint
venturers become promoters formally, they are legally members of
two separate partnership arrangements, one under the joint venture
contract and one as promoters, and in addition they can represent the
Embryo Company (seiritsuczi no kaisha) and can commit it to certain
obligations so long as these commitments are limited to matters of
incorporation, rather than commencement of business. 8 Also, under
the corporation law, all seven of the promoters will have fixed and
distinct duties, powers, and liabilities to the corporation and third
parties. 9 After the new corporation is formed, the partnership relation-
ship under the original joint venture contract may subsist, if such is
intended, in parallel with the corporate relationships among the same
joint venturers as shareholders. Joint venture or preincorporation
agreements coexist in a similar way in close corporations in some U.S.
36 COMMERCIAL CODE art. 165: "Seven or more promoters are required for the
incorporation of a 'kabushiki kaisha.""
Seven promoters are required only during incorporation. One shareholder only is
legal after registration; for example, where the other promoters transfer their shares to
one person, the prohibition against one shareholder does not apply to a kabushiki kaisha.
COMMERCIAL CODE arts. 404 and 94.
37 Nakajima v. KondS, 24 Minroku 1480, 1483 (Great Ct. of Cassation, July 10,
1918); Hyaku-sanjoihachi Bank v. Toyo Seien Co., 16 Minroku 982 (Great Ct. of
Cassation, Dec. 23, 1910); and cases cited in 13 (IV) HANREI TAIKEI (Compendium
of decisions) 206-09. See Kitazawa, Setsuritsu-chft no kaisha (Company under estab-
lishment process), in 1 KABUSHIKI KAISHAHO KOZA (Lectures on corporation law)
211, 218 (1958) ; and 1 ISHII, SnH6 (Commercial law) 163 (rev. ed. 1959).
38 Specifically note that transactions by promoters before the corporation comes into
existence which go beyond the scope of incorporation and have to do with the com-
mencement of the future companies' business are not binding on the corporation when
it comes into existence and the promoter may be held personally liable under CIVIL
CODE art. 675. Shinsei K~gy6 K.K. v. Shimazaki, 7 Kakyfi minshOi 890 (Tokyo Dist.
Ct., April 9, 1956) (new corporation not entitled to enforce a lease signed by person
before he became one of plaintiff's promoters; moreover, here the lease was connected
with future business, not incorporation). Tsuji v. Daiei Baseball K.K., 12 Minshfi
3228 (Sup. Ct., Oct. 24, 1958) (promoter liable personally to baseball team because
his arrangement for a game to celebrate the new company's inauguration was not
within the scope of promoters' duties re incorporation).
39 COMMERCIAL CODE arts. 186, 192-95 for liability of promoters. Note that in Japa-
nese law, unless he actually shows that he is signing for someone else, the person whose
signature appears on the articles of incorporation is the promoter, regardless of how
formalistic his participation may be intended to be by all concerned; Kakuda v.
Matsuura Suisan K.K., 22 Minroku 1862 (Great Ct. of Cassation, Oct. 7, 1916). For
many other cases and a discussion of promoters' liability see Takeuchi, Hokkinin no
sekinin (Liability of promoters), in 2 S6G HANREI KENKYUi SasSO SHOHo 147, 152
(1961).
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jurisdictions." However, the parallel spheres of contract and corporate
law are much more distinct in Japanese law than in most American
law as will be demonstrated. In summary then, the applicable law for
the interrelations of joint venturers and promoters is the partnership
contract law. The promoters, later the corporate shareholders, are, in
addition and at the same time, subject to the corporate law in relation
to the corporation and certain third parties.Y1
PROBLEMS OF FoRm
As mentioned, Japanese contracts, with few exceptions, need not be
in writing; nor must there be consideration. Since in fact joint venture
contracts are invariably in writing with mutual bilateral promises, these
points would hardly be problems anyway.
Who is the proper officer to sign a contract for a Japanese corpora-
tion? While it is easy, given the time and requisite know-how, to
determine from the public Corporate Registry (sit gyJ tkibo) who is
the person registered as the Representative Director (daihy5 torishi-
mariyaku) or manager of any Japanese corporation at a given office,43
still it frequently happens that hastily concluded contracts are signed
by other officers or agents of a Japanese company. This does not
necessarily mean that the corporation is not bound because others may
have authority by power-of-attorney from the representative director
40 E.g., Elsbach v. Mulligan, 58 Cal. App. 2d 354, 136 P.2d 651 (1943). See Note,
44 CALIF. L. Rv. 590 (1956). Contra. Jackson v. Hooper, 76 N.J.Eq. 592, 75 AtI. 568(Ct. Err. & App. 1910). See 69 HALv. L. REv. 565 (1956).
Some U.S. authorities say that a joint venture amongst promoters must terminate
upon incorporation because coexistence is inconsistent with the corporate structure.
Weisman v. Awnair Corp. of America, 3 N.Y2d 444, 144 N.E.2d 415 (1957). See
generally, Dambach, supra note 1; Hornstein, Judicial Tolerance of the Incorporated
Partnership, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 435, 443 (1953) ; and HENN, CORPORATIONs 65(1961).
Another problem is presented as to whether a corporation can be a joint venturer in
some U.S. jurisdictions where partnership law is largely applicable to joint ventures
and corporations are not allowed to enter a partnership. Usually, however, even in
such jurisdictions a corporation is permitted specifically to be a joint venturer.
Weisman v. Awnair Corp. of America, supra; U.S. Fid. and Guar. Co. v. Dawson
Produce Co., 200 Okla. 540, 197 P.2d 978 (1948) ; Nolan v. J. & M. Doyle Co., 338 Pa.
398, 13 A2d 59 (1940) ; Excelsior Motor Mfg. & Supply Co. v. Sound Equipment, Inc.,
73 F.2d 725 (7th Cir. 1934), cert. denied 294 U.S. 706 (1935). See ABA-ALI MODEL
Bus. CORP. ACT § 4(g) (1953).
41 See for details, Kitazawa, supra note 37, at 211, 218, 219.42 Ogoshi v. Tokyo Tatemono, 22 MinshCi 1845 (Great Ct. of Cassation, Oct. 4,
1916), where, of course, the court did not mention a lack of consideration, there being
no such requirement in Japanese law, but the court did enforce a promise to pay more
than the original contract called for without any further consideration from the other
party. See for comparison, von Mehren, Civil Law Analogues to Consideration: An,
Exercise in Comparative Analysis, 72 HAtv. L. REv. 1009 (1959).
43 CO IEERCIAL CODE art. 188(2) viii requires that the name of the daihyd torishi-
mariyaku be registered at the appropriate public registry and art. 40 provides for
registration of shihainin (managers).
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or even by "Apparent Authority (hydken daiky6)."''  To avoid diffi-
culty, it is preferable to make sure that the representative director signs
a document as important as a joint venture agreement. Also, in some
cases, the usual license agreements, sales contracts, and other arrange-
ments for the new corporation should be signed by the majority joint
venturer as representative of the promoters in order to bind the new
corporation and the majority joint venturer.
Most Japanese individuals have registered seals which they affix to
documents instead of signing them by hand, 5 although the custom of
using the handwritten signature by Japanese is becoming common in
international transactions. The very cautious person might find it
advisable to check both the registry certificate of the corporation to
ascertain the corporate existence and the registered representative's
correct name, and the Seal Certificate (inkan shimei) of the repre-
sentative at the commercial registry46 if he uses his seal. Thus, the
impression can then be compared with that used on the contract.
Another formal matter of importance should be mentioned-the
normal practice of providing in the contract that conflicts in interpre-
tation arising out of differences in the Japanese and English language
versions will be resolved by reference to the English. One of the major
language problems of these contracts relates to corporate control
devices in the pro forma articles of incorporation which are annexed
to the contract. These are required by law to be in Japanese." Quaere
44 COMMERCIAL CODE arts. 42, 262; also see CIVIL CoDE arts. 109, 110, 112.
45 Law Concerning Matters To Be Signed Under the Commercial Code (Shho-chfi
shoinei subeki baai ni kansuru horitsu) art. 1 (Law No. 17, 1900) provides for execu-
tion of commercial documents by seal.46 Commercial Registration Law (Shogya t6kih5) art. 12 (Law No. 125, 1963);
Commercial Registration Regulations (Shogyd t6ki kisoku) art. 16 (Ministry of
Judicial Affairs Regulation No. 112, 1951). The Commercial Registration Law was
enacted in 1963 and the provisions of the Law of Procedure in Non-Contentious
Matters (Hishd jiken tetsuzukiho) arts. 142-205 (Law No. 14, 1898), in 2 EHS No.
2380, which previously regulated this subject, were deleted. The representative's seal
is registered at the Commercial Registry, and this particular seal for- zorporate purposes
is usually different from the seal which the same individual files with the municipal
offices [in Tokyo the Ward Office (kuyakusho)] for his personal use.
47 E.g., see Commercial Registration Regulations (Sh6gy6 t6ki kisoku) art. 38
(Ministry of Judicial Affairs Regulation No. 112, 1951), which presupposes the
description to be in Japanese. According to the Notary Law, if the articles of
incorporation are made as a Notarial Deed (k6sei sh6sho), it must be in Japanese.
(Notary Law (KOshninha) art. 27 (Law No. 53, 1908) in 2 EHS No. 2050.)
However, in most cases, the articles of incorporation are drafted as a Private Deed
(shisho sh6sho) and the Notary (koshnin) can attest any private deed written in
a foreign language except that the statement of attestation must be in Japanese. (Notary
Law art. 27.) See Miyaji, Sasho ni kansuri tetsuzuki (Procedure for acknowledg-
ments), 10 JiYfi TO SEIGI (Freedom and justice) (No. 9) 30 (1959).
Of course, the language of the Japanese courts is Japanese. Court Organization Law
(Saibanshoha) art. 74 (Law No. 59, 1947) in 2 EHS No. 2010. However, there is
no such clear-cut provision for Non-Contentious Matters (hisho jiken) such as com-
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whether in a dispute on the contract in such a situation the Japanese
language would not in fact govern at least as to the rights of the joint
venture corporation and third parties?
SHARE RESTRICTIONS AND CORPORATE CONTROL DEVICES
Introduction: The problem here involves the interplay between the
corporation law and the preincorporation contract which the parties
intend shall control their future action (as shareholders, directors, or
officers) and through them, certain actions of the future joint corpora-
tion. Under the circumstances assumed, this immense field is essentially
a Japanese corporation and contract law problem, but any lawyer with
situational sense will be equally concerned with evidence, burdens of
proof, procedural efficacy, and remedies. In this situation inquiry
will be made as to whether in Japanese law pertinent kinds of pre-
incorporation obligations can subsist and be enforced after incorpora-
tion and, if so, what the efficacy of enforcement actions might be. The
latter inquiry extends to the effect on (1) the contracting joint venturers
as shareholders, (2) the joint corporation, and (3) third parties where
relevant. The availability of these remedies are particularly important
in case of violations of the agreements in three critical areas: (a) re-
strictions on share transfers; (b) corporate control mechanisms, variant
from the normal meeting and voting procedures of the corporation law;
and (c) transactions contemplated in the contract to be accepted and
carried out by the future joint corporation such as trademark, patent
and know-how licenses, sales agencies, supply contracts, capital equip-
ment imports, employment contracts for key engineers, and a host of
other items which may be critical in the over-all bargain to one or the
other of the parties.
It is a major problem of draftsmanship, after the creative planning,
negotiating, and adjusting have produced a bargain, to sort out the parts
of the over-all complex and to document them in optimum form-a
master contract, pro forma articles of incorporation, and various side
agreements or annexes. One problem is that official practice requires"
mercial registrations which are not within the jurisdiction of the court, but under the
Ministry of Justice. The Law of Procedure in Non-Contentious Matters (Hishu jiken
tetsuzukiht) art. 139 (Law No. 14, 1898) in 2 EHS No. 2380. Nevertheless, in Japa-
nese practice the registry will not accept foreign language documents for commercial
registration, such as articles of incorporation. So even though the articles had been
attested by a notary as a private deed they would not be accepted in a foreign language
by the registry office. Note that there is a similar rule against a trade name in English,
which also states that an English trade name cannot be accepted for registration.
1 Suzuxi, KABusHixi JITSumu (Practices relating to shares) 10 (1963).4 8 JKAGAKU K6GY6 Tfl 5HINSHA, op. cit. supra note 4, at 60.
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that the joint venture contract must annex draft articles of incorpora-
tion, and legally the parties may find it advisable to include some of the
above-mentioned policies in the articles. Others may simply subsist
in the master contract or in side agreements depending on whether they
need approval and how long they are intended to be effective. It shall
be seen that it can make a difference under Japanese law, as it does in
some American jurisdictions, whether the restrictions are in a side
agreement or the articles. Japanese corporation practice does not have
any exact counterpart to our by-laws, but something similar is often
instituted by the directors or shareholders to govern details of directors'
meetings, share transfer procedure, and the like.49 As distinguished
from American"° practice, however, such "by-laws" do not seem to have
been used for the re-distribution of corporate control powers in close
corporations.5' Obviously, the joint venture corporation under discus-
sion resembles the close corporation, 2 which in our domestic parlance
has been largely an operational rather than technical term because they
have traditionally received little special legislative support in the states
until very recently. However, Japanese corporation law, since 1938,
has provided for a juristic person called a Limited Company (yfigen-
gaiska),'" which was legislatively intended as a vehicle for this kind of
close-corporate enterprise. Like the English private company54 and the
German Company with Limited Liability (Gesellschaft mit beschrink-
ter Haftung),'" the yagengaisha law limits the number of Members
(shain) and permits informal meetings; restriction on membership
transfers; and simpler incorporation procedures, corporate structures,
49 See 1 TANAKA, SAISHIN KAISHAHO GAIRON (j) (General theory of company
law) 128-29 (1963), which notes that certain provisions of the Conmercial Code seem
to presuppose by-laws. E.g., see art. 282 (2).
Any shareholder or creditor of the company may, at any time during business
hours, demand inspection of the documents mentioned in the preceding paragraph
and may demand delivery of a copy or an abstract copy of such documents, paying
such fees as fixed by the company.
50 Even in some U.S. jurisdictions extraordinary controls over director or share-
holder action can only be provided in the articles. Others allow restrictions in the
by-laws. See 1 O'NEAL, op. cit. supra note 10, at 200-02 (1957).
51 Quaere whether unregistered "by-laws" providing for abbreviated procedures,
etc., would be valid under the corporation law?
52 Definitions of the close corporation vary, but generally the term means a corpora-
tion with only a few shareholders wherein ownership and management are coalesced
and the shares are not traded on the securities markets. 1 O'NEAL, op. cit. supra
note 10, at 2-5 discusses various criteria suggested by the writers and courts.
53 Limited Company Law (Yagengaishah) (Law No. 74, 1938).
54 See Gower, The English Private Company, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 535
(1953) ; and McFadyean, The American Close Corporation and Its British Equivalent,
14 Bus. LAW. 215 (1958).
55 Schneider, The American Close Corporation and Its German Equivalent, 14 Bus.
LAW. 228 (1958).
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records and notices; but it still provides the desired juristic separateness
and limited liability." Thousands of small, closely-held enterprises
avail themselves of this juristic form in Japan, but the words yfgen-
gaiska must appear in the company's name." Thus, unfortunately, in
Japanese business and financial circles it has a diminutive connotation,"
and therefore U.S.-Japanese joint ventures have seldom, if ever, availed
themselves of it. Instead the U.S.-Japanese joint venturers have gen-
erally chosen the Stock Corporation (kabuskiki kaiska), designed for
wide public shareholding, and thus they have invited upon themselves
many of the same problems of our clumsy, close corporation. Yet, the
availability of the yfigengaisha means that legal guidelines for close
kabushiki kaisha have been relatively unnecessary, and, therefore, un-
developed in Japan for fitting the requirements of a close corporation
into the formalistic framework and procedure of the stock corporation.
In contrast, our U.S. law (despite a multitude of close corporations)
has never provided an adequate separate juristic entity designed for
them." Only recently are these special problems beginning to get
partial recognition in our statutes and judicial precedents, and even
these changes are taking place largely within the ponderous corporation
law framework designed for publicly held corporations."0 Ironically,
5 6 See generally, TANAKA, YOSHINAGA & YAMAaEURA, ZEN=E KOMZMNTARU
KAISHA116 (Completely revised commentary on company law) 1405-1527 (1964) ;
1 Isrr, op. cit. supra note 37, at 556; NomuRA, YEiGENGAISHA SETSURITSU ANNAI
(Guide to establishment of a limited company) (1964).
57 Limited Company Law (Yfigengaishaho) art. 3 (1) (Law No. 74, 1938).
58 See Osumi, Nishihara & Ueda, Kabushiki kaishah6 no komponteki kaisei ni tsuite
no kenkya (Study on basic revision of the stock corporation law), SH5ji 5mu
KENKYU (No. 30) 1, 5 (1956). The Members (shain) are limited to 50, but the size
of capital and operations are, of course, not limited. They could conceivably attain
great size, for example, like the Ford Motor Company in this country, before it went
public.
59 1 O'NwL, op. cit. supra note 10, at 27; Weiner, Legislative Recognition of the
Close Corporation, 27 MicH. L. Rnv. 273 (1929).
60 Note that the Ill. Bus. Corp. Act, in contrast to New York's pre-amendment law,
is said to be flexible enough to accommodate the close corporation reasonably well.
Cary, How Illinois Corporations May Enjoy Partnership Advantages: Planning for
the Closely Held Firm, 48 Nw. U.L. RE-v. 427, 440 (1953). See also N.Y. Bus. Corp.
Law (effective Sept. 1, 1963) ; and N.C. Gm. STAT. § 55-73 (Supp. 1955) :
b) Except in cases where the shares of the corporation are at the time or sub-
sequently become generally traded in the markets maintained by securities dealers
or brokers, no written agreement to which all of the shareholders have actually
assented, whether embodied in the charter or bylaws or in any side agreement in
writing and signed by all the parties thereto, and which relates to any phase of
the affairs of the corporation, whether to the management of its business or division
of its profits or otherwise, shall be invalid as between the parties thereto, on the
ground that it is an attempt by the parties thereto to treat the corporation as if it
were a partnership or to arrange their relationships in a manner that would be
appropriate only between partners .... A transferee of shares covered by such
agreement who acquires them with knowledge thereof is bound by its provisions.
c) An agreement between all or less than all of the shareholders, whether solely
between themselves or between one or more of them and a party who is not a
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then, our long and awkward experience with the close corporation has
produced precedents, literature, and even a treatise6 useful as com-
parative guides for coping with partnership-type enterprises which
choose to avoid, for reasons of prestige, the legally most appropriate
vehicle in Japan, and instead set up a kabushiki kaisha.
Restrictions on the Transfer of Shares: Having usually invested
considerable time and effort in carefully selecting each other for the
enterprise at hand, U.S.-Japanese joint venturers understandably want
to restrict the sale of shares to insure that the joint Japanese corpora-
tion will continue to be jointly owned by them alone. To this end,
they usually agree on some restriction such as first-refusal rights for
the other party in case one shareholder wants to sell. The first question
raised by such a clause is the scope of the Commercial Code provision62
which expressly forbids the prohibition or restriction of the transfer
of shares of kabushiki kaisha.3
Contractual limitations, apparently violative of the Commercial Code
prohibitions against share transfer restrictions [article 204(1)], are
considered valid and enforceable by most legal scholars in Japan. The
key to understanding the limited legal effect given to article 204(1) by
the Japanese scholars is in the systematic code structure of Japanese
law, which separates contract and corporate law principles and gives
them parallel validity in their own spheres. Thus, article 204(1) is
thought to prevent only share transfer restrictions in the intra-corporate
structure, articles of incorporation, rules (by-laws), and resolutions.
So on this theoretical level restrictive contracts (1) between the
shareholder, is not invalid, as between the parties thereto, on the ground that it so
relates to the conduct of the affairs of the corporation as to interfere with the
discretion of the board of directors, but the making of such an agreement shall
impose upon the shareholders who are parties thereto the liability for managerial
acts that is imposed by this chapter upon directors.
Also, the Florida Bar Association is drafting a new close corporation law.
61 Both the cases and the periodical literature are exhaustively cited throughout
both volumes of O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS (1958) (Supp. 1963).
62 COMMERCIAL CODE art. 204(1) : "The transfer of a share shall not be prohibited
or restricted even by the provisions of the articles of incorporation." Article 204(1)
was added by an occupation-sponsored amendment (Law No. 167, 1950), which also
changed other features of Japanese corporation law relating to shares and shareholders.
See Sono, Shoh6 kaisei no ripporon-teki tenkai (On the movement for revision of the
Japanese Commercial Code), in SH616 KAISEI NO DOKO TO KIHON 1MONDAI (Trend
for Commercial Code revision and its basic problems) 1, 18-20, 141 (1961). In English,
see Salwin, The New Commercial Code of Japan: Symbol of Gradual Progress
Toward Democratic Goals, 50 GEO. L.J. 478 (1962).
63 Note that COMIMERCIAL COnE art. 204(1) only applies to kabushiki kaisha. There
are two other types of juristic entities (besides yagengaisha, text accompanying note 53
supra), provided in the COMMERCIAL CODE, Book II. They are goinei kaisha (arts.
62-145) and g6shi kaisha (arts. 146-64), both of which resemble in some respects our
partnership. Being of unlimited liability, they are normally inappropriate for an inter-
national joint venture.
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corporation and a shareholder or (2) between shareholders are legally
outside the operative sphere of corporation law, and despite article
204(1) they will be enforced by the usual remedies for breach of
contract. Only one relevant case since 1950 has been found,64 and the
treatise authority is divided on the enforceability of the corporation-
shareholder agreements. 5 On upholding shareholder-shareholder con-
tracts which restrict transfers, however, the authorities are almost
unanimous."6 Judge Matsuda is a notable exception."
Thus, given the general validity of shareholder agreements restricting
transfers, the remaining question is: How useful are the legal remedies
of the non-transferring shareholder against the transferor, the trans-
feree, or the corporation? Can he get damages, injunctive relief, or
recover from the transferee and correct the registration of the shares
on the corporation shareholder list?
Consistent with the contract-corporate law dichotomy, most schol-
ars6s seem to agree that, since the 1950 amendment, contractual
restrictions on transfer of shares can only bind the parties and do not
affect the right of the transferee, whether he takes with notice of the
restrictions or not. 9 The non-transferring shareholder has a damage
64 T6hoku K6gy6 K.K. v. T6hoku Aen K6gy5 K.K., 6 Kakyii minshi 950 (Tokyo
Dist. Ct., May 9, 1960), which has been criticized for upholding a transfer condition.
Upon failure of the conditions, the court denied the transferee's right to the share.
The criticism was that this kind of agreement should not affect a third-party transferee,
and that it should only give rise to a claim for damages between the shareholders.
TANAKA, YOSHINAGA & YAWrAMURA, op. cit. supra note 56, at 467.
For insights on the law before the 1950 amendment to art. 204, which allowed both
contractual and corporate restrictions, see Okura v. Iwata, 1 Kakyil minshii 1697(Tokyo Dist. Ct., Oct. 25, 1950), where the restriction by contract between shareholders
was upheld in an action under CoMMEacIA. CODE art. 247 to rescind a resolution, the
propriety of which depended on whether the transferee had a right to vote.
;5 E.g., MATSUDA, SHIN KAISHAHO GAMON (Treatise on the new stock corporation
law) 154-55 (1957), and TANAKA, YOSHINAGA & YAMAMURA, op. cit. supra note
56, at 466, would strike down most corporation-shareholder transfer restrictions as
violative of art. 204(1) ; but 1(1) Ismri, SH6ao (Commercial Law) 298 (1963) ; and
SUzUKI & ISHEr, KAISEr KABusHrIKr KAISHAH6 xISKSrSU (Commentary on the revised
stock corporation law) 8 (1951), would uphold most corporation-shareholder agree-
ments, except those of the adherence type (i.e., subscription forms, etc.).6C E.g., 1(1) Ismii, op. cit. supra note 65, at 299; and TANAKA, YOSHINAGA &
Y.MAMURA, op. cit. supra note 56, at 467.
G7 MATSUDA, op. cit. supra note 65, at 155, takes the view, stemming apparently from
his individualistic Obligation Theory (saikensetsu) regarding shareholders' rights, that
all such contractual restrictions are void.
68 Osumi, Kabushiki no jito (Transfer of shares), in 2 KAnUsHIKi xAISHAHO
K6ZA (Lectures on corporation law) 639, 648 (1956) ; 1 (1) Isan, op. cit. supra note
65, at 299.69 Note that the pre-amendment cases uniformly held, with only one exception, that
a transfer restriction provided in the articles of incorporation always bars the acquisi-
tion of the right by the transferee, whether he was a bona fide transferee or not. See
cases cited in 17 (III) HANm TAiKEr (Compendium of decisions) 508-13. Also, cf.
discussion of the T6hoku K6gy6 case note 64 supra, which was decided under the
new law.
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claim against the transferor, but the proof of damages for a violative
transfer of shares without a ready market would be difficult, especially
since most of the damage would result from the risk to the enterprise
introduced by a strange new shareholder,7 a practically immeasurable
factor. Thus, the most effective remedy would be an injunction to
prevent any transfers in breach of the agreement, but, again the chances
of getting enough information and court action on the threshold of an
illegal transfer are highly unlikely. If the situation permits, however,
the law is encouraging. The courts can grant an injunction7 and order
that a notice thereof be inserted in the registry of the company or,
alternatively, the court may order that the shares be delivered to the
bailiff for safekeeping." Note, however, that injunctions are limited
to the parties to the action or the persons named therein. A case re-
garding a disputed telephone right held that if a violative transfer
occurs, the company, which was not mentioned in the injunction, must
register the right at the request of the transferee" (even after an in-
junction against the transfer and even though the transfer occurred
with notice). Being non-negotiable, the telephone right is hardly
comparable to a corporate share, which is necessarily negotiable, and
o The writer witnessed a similar problem in one joint venture when the U.S. firm
was bought by another U.S. firm with less interest and concern for foreign operations.
71 Unreported v. Unreported, 29 HANREI TAIKEI (Compendium of decisions) 704
(Osaka Dist. Ct., Sept. 6, 1939). The court dismissed (kikyaku) an attack under
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 759 against an injunction ordering the petitioner not to
transfer shares.
72 See KANEIO, KY6SEI SHIKKO6H6 (Execution law) 294 (1951) ; and KIKUKAWA,
HANREI 1OZEN SHOBUN (Provisional disposition decisions) 200 (1959).
73 Shimomura v. Japan, 18 Minshfi 761 (Great Ct. of Cassation, July 19, 1939),
supported by scholarly comments in KIIKUKAWA, op. cit. supra note 72, at 197, 200,
and in Case No. 53 (Kurusu's comment), in HANREI MINJIIH6, SH16WA J6YONENDO
(Judicial review of civil cases, 1939).
This holding is explained by the doctrine of Relative Effect (sctaiteki kdryoku) of
injunctions. Since injunctions should only bind parties so included in the action,
persons not parties to the action or not actually named in an injunction are free from
its effect. In this case, the injunction only prohibited a transfer by the transferee,
and, though the telephone company was informed of this injunction, it could not
effectively bind the company by prohibiting it to change the registration.
This restrictive use of the so-called doctrine of relative effect of injunctions is very
important on the practice level, and it also leads to the conclusion that injunctions
must be specific as to the parties. E.g., where X obtains an injunction prohibiting Y
company from registering a transfer of shares from A to B, X still cannot prevent
A's transferring those shares to C, and Y company cannot refuse C's request to
register. At the same time an attempt to obtain an injunction against all third parties
in general would not be supported, since it would injure some interested third parties
then unknown, and violate the doctrine of relative effect. See also, Nomura v. Fuji
Seitetsu, 10 Kata saibansho minji hanreishOi [hereafter cited K5sai minshfi] 181
(Tokyo High Ct., April 19, 1957; Kaneko, Kabushiki ni taisuru kyasei shikk4 (Exe-
cution on shares), in 2 KABUSHIKI KAISHAH6 K6ZA (Lectures on corporation law)
765,774 (1956).
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so a transferee of a corporate share in violation of an injunction would
unquestionably obtain good title.7'
In summary then, despite the clear language of Commercial Code
article 204(1) against restrictions on transfer, the weight of authority
limits the effect of article 204(1) to the intra-corporate law sphere.
The authorities, therefore, support the parallel validity and enforce-
ability of contractual restrictions both for damages or a preventative
injunction in the case of a shareholder-shareholder contract, howsoever
impractical the latter might be in the usual case. Some authority,
notably Ishii, would support reasonable, corporation-shareholder con-
tracts as well. No remedy either against the corporation to cancel the
registry or against the transferee to regain title is generally supported
by the authorities except in the case where the transfer proceeded in
violation of an active injunction. Matsuda"5 would strike down such
restrictive contractual clauses under article 204(1) and deny them
enforcement of any sort, but no decision has been found following his
interpretation.
It should be noted again, however, that despite the validity of and
legalistic remedies for breach of share transfer restrictions, the fact is
that usually a timely injunction to prevent a sale is impossible and if a
violative sale occurs, the amount or even the fact of actual damages is
often prohibitively difficult to prove. The parties are, therefore, well
advised to include a reasonable liquidated damage clause in the joint
venture agreement providing that if a wrongful sale is made, the seller
will pay the other party a sum fixed in advance. The Japanese Civil
Code provides for such clauses and forbids the courts to vary the
amount." This provision thus seems to prevent a court from refusing to
enforce a liquidated damage clause because it is too high or a
"penalty,"77 in our terms. Extreme amounts have been struck down,
however, as violating public policy,"' but generally Japanese law has no
74 Cf. KixuKAWA, oP. cit. sAuPra note 72, at 200.
75 MATSUDA, op. cit. supra note 65, at 154-55.
76 CiWL CoDE art. 420:
1. The parties may determine in advance the amount of compensation for dam-
ages payable in the event of the non-performance of an obligation; in such case the
Court cannot increase or reduce the amount.
2. The determination in advance of the amount of compensation for damages
shall not prejudice the obligee's right to demand performance or rescission.
3. A penalty is presumed to be a determination in advance of the amount of
compensation for damages.77 Utano v. Gyokuz6b6, 1 Minshfi 431 (Great Ct. of Cassation, July 26, 1922)
(liquidated damages granted despite lessee-defendant's claim that the land had been
leased again after the breach without any actual loss) ; Mitate v. Takabashi, 13 Minroku
36 (Great Ct. of Cassation, Feb. 2, 1907) (proof of actual loss not required).7 8 Yamamura v. Kanzald, 23 Minshfi 147 (Great Ct. of Cassation, Nov. 14, 1944)
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overriding concept of penalty. Rather, such clauses are upheld without
superimposing the court's judgment as to the adequacy of the amount or
even the existence of any damages, unless they are contra bonos mores.
Since both parties may be equally interested in such a provision at the
time of contracting, it may be feasible, in spite of the disenchantment
usually occasioned by introducing such ideas into the final stages of
negotiations.
Corporate Control Devices for Protection of Minority Interests: In
the U.S. a variety of devices including preincorporation agreements
between prospective shareholders are used to effect custom-made
controls over close corporations-voting trusts, pooling agreements,
irrevocable proxies, specific employment and management contracts,
as well as diverse charter and by-law arrangements to insure veto
power for the minority by requiring extraordinary quorums and votes
of both the shareholders and the board or by shifting decision-making
power between them to achieve a veto effect over specific critical
corporate actions. The utility of one or combinations of these measures
in the U.S. depends on the promoters' bargain, the nature of the
business, the statutes of the state"9 chosen for incorporation, and other
factors."0
In U.S.-Japanese joint ventures, the shareholders similarly desire to
act as partners among themselves but as shareholders with limited
liability toward the outside world. They want to be able to act in-
formally by agreement, and in order to insure a position for itself in
corporate policymaking the minority, in particular, must rely on such
agreements to avoid coercive majority votes. It has been demonstrated
that, as their corporate vehicle, they ordinarily choose the kabushiki
kaisha, which is as ponderously over-equipped for close corporation
purposes as our general corporation. Specific attention, therefore, must
(denied, as against CIVIL CODE art. 90, liquidated damages for delay of payment on a
note, where the amount was excessive, even though the usury law might not apply to
a commercial matter).
79 E.g., N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 715 (effective 1963) provides that shareholders may
be allowed to elect officers. The new New York and the new North Carolina statutes
are most responsive to close corporation needs; and the Florida Bar Association has
a close corporation statute in draft.
so See 1 O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS 188 (charter and by-law arrangements), 222
(shareholder agreements) (1957) ; Powers, Cross-Fire on the Close Corporation:
Norms Versus Needs, 11 FLA. L. REV. 433 (1958) ; Hoban, Voting Control Methods,
1958 ILL. L. F. 110; Comment, "Shareholders' Agreemnentss" and Statutory Norns, 43
CORNELL L.Q. 68 (1957) ; Comment, Emzployment Contracts, Validity of Shareholders'
Agreement Providing for Employment, 46 IOWA L. REV. 146 (1960) ; Chayes, Madame
Wagner and the Close Corporation, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1532 (1960) ; O'Neal, Arrange-
mnents Which Protect Minority Shareholders Against "Squeeze-Outs," 45 MINN. L.
REV. 537 (1961).
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be given to control problems in each venture, and each problem requires
its own specific solution. The purpose here is only to indicate from the
richer U.S. experiences which devices may be most useful in drafting
joint venture contracts for Japan operations.
Corporate Controls; Effect of FIL Approvals on the Contract: It
should again be noted that in Japan the character of this kind of
corporate control problem is significantly conditioned by the shape of
the venture imposed by the postwar Japanese governmental policy of
excluding foreign majority equities in Japanese enterprises. Ordinarily,
the parties also stipulate that FIL approval is a condition precedent
to the effectiveness of the master joint venture contract. One of the
strong, though seldom articulated reasons for the Japanese policy
against foreign majorities, is doubtless to prevent foreign management
control. So whatever the motivation or wisdom of the policy, it means
that the American investors' problems are limited to protecting minority
interests by veto provisions and the like. It also means that adroitly
patterned, multi-class, share structures, which must appear in the docu-
ments to be submitted for approval and which aim at giving the foreign
minority a control over major policies, would ordinarily not be any more
acceptable to the Japanese foreign investment authorities than more
forthright requests for approval of majority ownership. Since the
official validation is apparently now a condition precedent to a for-
eigner's right to acquire shares in a Japanese corporation,8 however
much this may conflict with the spirit of the U.S.-Japanese Friendship,
Commerce, and Navigation Treaty (1953), it becomes important to
decide just what parts of the total bargain need FIL approval. This
can influence the choice between the two general methods of formalizing
veto devices agreed between the joint venturers: (1) shareholder agree-
ments; and (2) provision in pro forma articles of incorporation. Also,
for the parties' ease of future reference certain kinds of obligations fit
best in separate contracts; that is, those agreements which are intended
to have subsisting effect between the parties even after incorporation.
There are three parts to this drafting and distribution question: first,
what parts of the total arrangements does the FIL say must be sub-
mitted and approved, and second, in doubtful instances involving risks,
what are the administrative law consequences of mistake and violation?
The third and related question inquires into the contract law effects of
a shareholder's agreement which should have been, but has not been
81 FIL (Gaishi ni kansuru hiritsu) arts. 10 and 11 (Law No. 163, 1950, as amended
by Law No. 33, March 31, 1964, effective April 1, 1964).
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validated. The answer to these first two questions would depend on
specifics, but in general the FILs2 requires in these situations validation
of share acquisitions (thus requiring submission of the proposed articles
of incorporation) and inductions of technology only, leaving open the
possibility that other side arrangements between the joint venturers
as prospective shareholders need not be submitted, or might be sub-
mitted later. The law does not specifically forbid foreign control, and
there may be some side agreements giving a veto with legal efficacy
only as a contract between the parties which, depending upon the
situation, would not need validation. If it is deemed necessary to make
the veto binding in the corporate law, then it must be put into the
articles and receive FIL approval. If approval is required and not
obtained, penalties, including even imprisonment, may be incurred.8"
When approval is required by the administrative law, the third
question relating to the effect between the parties of an unapproved
contract has been of interest to foreigners throughout the period of
tight Japanese foreign exchange controls, but it was only recently
litigated. The cases84 examined have all held that such unapproved
contracts are valid, but what sort of enforcement they might be en-
titled to in court is not as clear. The result on the point of validity is
82 !bid.
'3 See JUKAGAKU KOGY6 TSSISHINSHA, GAIKOKU GIJUTSU DONYUi YORAN (Guide to
induction of foreign technology) 54-62 (1964) for details of application for approval
under the FIL. FIL arts. 26 and 29 provide criminal penalties of up to three years'
imprisonment and/or Y300,000 fine for violation of the law. Note, however, that FIL
approval is still not a prerequisite for the registration of a Japanese corporation by
foreign promoters even after the FIL amendment (Law No. 33, March 31, 1964)
requiring validation of all direct investments.
84 Lewin v. Greenberg, 11 Kakyai minshfi 2034 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Sept. 30, 1960).
Both parties in this suit for $10,000 were Americans. Defendant was a resident, and
plaintiff was a non-resident. Thus, the transaction required a license under the Foreign
Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law (Gaikoku kawase oyobi gaikoku bieki
kanrih) art. 27 (Law No. 228, 1949) [hereafter cited FECL]. Defendant asserted
both (1) a lack of foreign exchange license and (2) duress as defenses. Judgment
was for defendant, based on duress. But, in so deciding, the court also found that the
lack of an FECL license did not invalidate the plaintiff's claim, reasoning that the
FECL could not deprive the court of competence to handle suits between residents
and non-residents. The holding has been properly criticized for reaching the right
decision for wrong reasons. It would seem that the case has nothing to do with the
court's competence; rather, the issue was whether the FECL restrictions invalidated
an unapproved contract, and consistent with Japanese legal concept, the answer is that
it would not, because the FECL is a regulatory law with its own purposes (and en-
forcement measures) going only to means of payment quite separate from the contract
law, which creates private rights. For a critical comment on this case by Nishi, see
JURISTO (No. 241) 127 (1962). See also Nainoto, Gaikoku kawase oyobi gaikoku
b5eki kanri hoki to sono sh,5gaiteki koryoku ni tsuite (Concerning the laws and
regulations for control of foreign exchange and foreign trade and their external
effect), 54 KOKUSAT16 GAIK6 zASSH1I ("The Journal of International Law and
Diplomacy") (No. 4) 47, 79 (1955). Greenhill Trading Co. v. Shiro Trading Corp.,
13 K6sai minshi! 696 (Tokyo High Ct., Oct. 29, 1960), recognizing an unapproved
claim, conditioned on obtaining foreign exchange approval. The court's decision has
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consistent with earlier scholarly theory" and precedents86 of Japanese
law which also compartmentalize the operative spheres of adminis-
trative (public) and contract (private) law, much as they do contract
and corporate law as noted in the transfer restriction discussion above.
The new FIL requirement, enacted in April, 1964, to the effect that
certain contractual obligations themselves (not just payments) between
Japanese and foreign investors must be approved could be enough more
basic and restrictive in policy to justify finding the unapproved contract
itself void, or at least unenforceable, to this writer's way of thinking.
But it is doubtful whether the Japanese courts would find such a nexus
between private and public law enforcement." Only future decisions
will reveal the practical answer.
Corporate Controls; Shareholder Control Agreements: In this con-
nection, there is another interstitial problem of Japanese contracts and
corporation law similar to the one noted in the discussion of share
transfer restrictions." In Japan, as elsewhere, the enforceability of
shareholder agreements effecting corporate structure, procedures, and
control are greatly affected by the basic theory underlying corporations
in the legal system. For example, in English law the limited liability
corporation evolved from partnership in turn based on contract and
this approach still influences English statutes and decisions to allow the
been criticized for attaching a condition, JuaIsuTo (No. 229) 82 (1961). Suzuki v.
Japan, 11 Kakyfi minshui 779 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., April 11, 1960). Cf. G. M. Casaregi
Compagnia de Navigazione e commerco S.P.A. v. Nishi Sh6ji K.K., 10 Kakyf minshdi
1711 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Aug. 30, 1959), upholding an unapproved arbitration agree-
ment between resident and non-resident.
85 1 WAGATSt MA, MIMP6 X6G1 (Lectures on the Civil Code) 225 (1963).86Tamaki v. Nakagawa, 25 Minshl 1715 (Great Ct. of Cassation, Sept. 25, 1919)
(unlicensed plaintiff, who maintained a Rendezvous (machiai) for customers, was not
precluded from collecting his fees).
87 Note that for public policy reasons in lizuka v. Haritani, 26 Minroku 774 (Great
Ct. of Cassation, May 28, 1920), the court denied promised support to a woman
plaintiff from a man married to another woman as contra bonas nwres, Cwv-m CODE
art. 90, because plaintiff knew of defendant's married status. For treatise discussion
of public policy considerations as stated in a statute which might invalidate violative
contracts, see 1 WAGATsuMA, op. cit. supra note 85, at 223-26.
Quaere what kind of regulatory statutes, if any, in Japan would be deemed to
establish a policy strong enough to void a conflicting contract? It seems that the
Japanese concept of separate operative spheres for administrative and private contract
law is basically different from the early position of our common law that contracts
opposed to acts of Parliament were void. Of course with increased regulation of all
activity, our law has long since receded from such an inflexible position and now
often contracts are enforced though they may violate a pertinent regulatory statute,
except where the statute expressly prohibits such a contract. E.g., Kaiser-Frazer
Corp. v. Otis & Co., 195 F2d 838 (2d Cir. 1952). See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
§ 580 (1932); 6A CoRnIN, CONTRACTS § 1374 (1962), and cases there cited. See
Chapman v. Zakzaska, 273 Wis. 64, 76 N.W.2d 537 (1956), where the court reasoned,
like the Japanese courts, that the regulation had its remedies and that accomplishing
its purpose did not require voiding a contrary contract.
88 See text accompanying notes 62-65 supra.
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incorporators to fix the corporate procedures and control features (i.e.,
voting and quorums) freely by contract. The English corporate law
rules in this area are thus largely optional and for convenience if the
parties do not wish to supersede them by special arrangement. 9
On the other hand, in both Japan and the United States, the concept
of corporation law is different in that the rules are to a degree at least
mandatory and not subject to overriding contractual arrangements of
the incorporators. In the United States, this theory stems from the
early practice of granting corporate charters by special acts of the legis-
lature giving rise to the so-called concession theory of incorporation.
In the later general incorporation laws, it came to mean that the
"corporate norms" embodied in the law were conceived as mandatory
and designed mostly for publicly held corporations and to protect the
public and shareholders. Japan, without such a history of special
charter grants, nevertheless treats the corporate rules as mandatory
unless the law otherwise provides. In addition, however, the systematic
character of the code tends to support the theory that the corporate law
requirements are only mandatory in the intra-corporate structure and
as to corporate action as such.90
In consequence then, though the U.S. and Japanese law both tend
to treat the corporate law control requirements as more generally
imperative than the English contract theory, the Japanese law has
little difficulty at the same time in holding that contrary contracts in
their separate spheres are both valid and enforceable between the
parties for damages at least.
The U.S. cases show their usual variety of holdings, exacerbated
especially in this instance by early failures to recognize in the legisla-
tion the obviously different needs of close and publicly held corpora-
tions. Some U.S. cases hold that the shareholders cannot vary the
control mechanisms fixed by the corporate law, and if they try to do so,
the by-law9 or contract92 will not be enforced. Others will enforce
89 See Gower, Some Contrasts Between British and American Corporation Law,
69 H~Av. L. REV. 1369, 1375-76 (1956).
90 17 (II) HANREI TAIKEI (Compendium of decisions) 190, where a provision in
the articles to the effect that directors would be liable for the company's obligation
was held by a Tokyo Appellate Chamber decision (Mar. 14, 1932) not to make
directors liable directly to a corporate creditor.
91 Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, Inc., 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E2d 829 (1945) ; Sensa-
baugh v. Poison Plywood Co., 135 Mont. 562, 342 P.2d 1064 (1959). In these cases
the courts declined to enforce admittedly invalid by-laws as contracts between the
parties.
92 Compare, e.g., Jackson v. Hooper, 76 N.J. Eq. 592, 75 At. 568 (Ct. of Err. App.
1910), and Loverdos v. Vomvouras, 200 N.Y.S.2d 921, 923 (1960) (holding against
survival of preincorporation joint venture agreements because they are inconsistent
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shareholder contracts as such even though they may be invalid as by-
laws.93 Overall, however, the needs of the close corporation in the
United States seem to be leading to more enforcement of contracts
which are contrary to the corporate law provisions. Similar separate
and distinct treatment of corporate and contract law has been forth-
rightly recognized in Japanese law from the beginning, thus contrary
contractual provisions are normally valid. Again, the only question is
whether there are any useful remedies given the fact that the corporate
law is adverse and no action is possible against the corporation in case
of breach."
Corporate Controls; Provisions in the Articles: Because of the
inherent inadequacy of affirmative injunctions to enforce contracts
entirely dependent upon cooperation in a close corporation, the desired
veto devices for a foreign minority in Japan are probably best achieved
in the articles of incorporation by adjusting quorum and voting ratios
required for decision within the scope allowed by the code, coupled with
cumulative voting in electing directors. At the outset, however, it
should be noted that this technique will not insure a veto for a minority
of one third or less because a two-thirds' vote will amend the articles
and this vote is not legally subject to variations in the articles." Also,
it is necessary to provide for preemptive rights to new shares in the
articles in order to enable the minority to maintain its shareholding
ratio. Otherwise, the code authorizes the Board to decide upon a share
issue, although if preemptive rights are allocated to outsiders, a two-
with the corporate form) with De Boy v. Harris, 207 Md. 212, 13 A2d 903 (1955),
noted, 69 HARv. L. REv. 565 (1956) (holding for survival).
93 E. K. Buck Retail Stores v. Harkert, 157 Neb. 867, 62 N.W.2d 288 (1954).
Cf. New England Trust Co. v. Abbott, 162 Mass. 148, 38 N.E. 432 (1894) ; Barrett v.
King, 181 Mass. 476, 63 N.E. 934 (1902). In both of these latter cases, it was argued
that the by-laws restricting share transfers were illegal; however, the court enforced
the restrictions as contracts, without actually determining whether as by-laws they
were illegal. See also Sensabaugh v. Polson Plywood Co., 135 Mont. 562, 342 P.2d
1064, 1067 (1959) (dictum), to the effect that denying cumulative voting by contract
would be legal, even though the decision was that such a by-law was against the
state constitution.
94 Note the majority in Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, Inc., 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E.2d
829, 832 (1948), in answering the argument of the dissenters that the illegal by-laws
should be enforced as a contract, were "at a loss to understand how any court could
entertain a suit, or frame a judgment, to enforce such a compact" (i.e., to compel
unanimous voting of shareholders and directors).9 5 COMMERCIAL CODE arts. 342(1) and 343:
342(1) For effecting any alteration of the articles of incorporation, a resolution
of the general meeting of shareholders is required.
343 The resolution provided for in paragraph 1 of the preceding Article shall be
adopted by two-thirds or more of the votes of the shareholders present who hold
shares representing more than one-half of the total number of the issued shares.
See TANAKA, YOSHINAGA & YAMAMURA, op. cit. supra note 56, at 1164.
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thirds' vote under Commercial Code article 343 is required [article
280-2(2)]. If preemptive rights are provided and the minority can
block an amendment, then the articles can insure a veto power by
extraordinary vote on most matters.
The reason for this approach, where the minority has more than one
third, is that the irrevocable proxy, the voting trust, and share classes
are ordinarily not practicable in Japan. The scholars are unanimous
in the view that voting trusts and irrevocable proxies96 are not legal
in Japanese corporate law." This conclusion flows from the require-
ment that shareholder proxies be limited in effect to a single meeting 8
which rules out irrevocable proxies and has been interpreted to bar
voting trusts also. Presumably they are, however, effective as contracts,
subject to the weaknesses of affirmative remedies discussed above.
On the other hand, different classes of shares are possible in Japanese
corporation law,99 including preferred shares (up to 25% of the total
shares), which may be nonvoting so long as preferred dividends are
not suspended."'0 In practice, however, preferred shares in general are
exceedingly rare in Japan (or any type of share except par value, non-
bearer common), and preferred shares seem to carry implications of
fiscal weakness. Besides, they are cumbersome for attaining no more
96 Note that the provision against irrevocable proxies [COMMERCIAL CODE art.
239(4)] is not held to prevent appointment of a Permanent Representative (jonin
dairinin) in Japan to act for foreign shareholders. Both the corporate practice and
the recent scholarly comment support the proposition that a foreign shareholders' Japan
representative, duly appointed, can vote for the shareholder without special proxies at
each meeting and can also appoint a sub-proxy. See 3 SUzuKi, KABUSHIKI JITSUmU
(Practice relating to shares) 76-78 (1963).
9T As to the various aspects of the voting trust problem, see Ueda, Giketsniken to
sono dairi-koshi (Voting right and its proxy), in Zoxu JITSU-MU KA.USHIKI
KAISHAHO ROKK& (Six more essays on practical stock corporation law) 155, 164
(SH6jI HM6u KENKYEIKAI ed. 1960); Kawamoto, Kimei kabuken to furikae kessai
seido (Non-bearer shares and the exchange system by way of pooling shares with a
trustee), 13 K6BE H6GAxU ZASSHI ("Kobe Law Journal") 18, 72, 74 (1963) ; Sono,
supra note 62, at 118.
98 COMMERCIAL CODE art. 239(3) and (4):
3. A shareholder may exercise his vote by proxy. Such a proxy, however,
shall file with the company a document establishing his power of representation.
4. The confinement of the power of representation mentioned in the preceding
paragraph shall be made for each general meeting.
99 COMMERCIAL CODE art. 222. See 2 SUZUKI, op. cit. .nipra note 96, at 7-10.
LOO COMMERCIAL CODE art. 242(1) and (2) :
1. In cases where a company issues two or more classes of shares, it may be
provided for by the articles of incorporation that with respect to shares of pre-
ferred class regarding the distribution of profits, a shareholder shall not be entitled
to vote; however, such shareholder shall be entitled to vote from the time when
the resolution to the effect that he shall not receive the preferred distribution
provided for by the articles of incorporation has been adopted to the time when the
resolution to the effect that he shall receive such distribution has been adopted.
2. The total number of the shares mentioned in the preceding paragraph shall
not exceed one-fourth of the total number of the issued shares.
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than veto power in an otherwise simple close corporate arrangement,
and if they do more, they could complicate the official validation
process.
In placing minority veto power in the articles of incorporation, drafts-
men must pay careful attention to the code provisions. They specify
certain items which must be in the articles (zettaiteki kisai jikd);
others are made optional in various provisions of the code, but they
must be placed in the articles if they are to be effective (sitaiteki kisai
jikd); and still other provisions may be freely inserted (niniteki kisai
jikJ) even though they are not treated in the codes so long as they do
not violate the law or contradict the basic corporate concepts or
public policy. 10'
The details of corporation law and incorporation procedure are a
separate subject, so only the code provisions defining the boundaries
for draftsmanship will be indicated. The most basic provision is, of
course, the amending power in Commercial Code article 343 requiring
a two-thirds' vote, and as mentioned, this vote is not subject to modifi-
cation in the articles. It is clear enough that minorities with less than
a third cannot be given a veto power in the articles which is secure
against amendments. Given the requisite one third of the voting
shares, the code provisions relevant to a veto power over corporate
policy are those which specify quorums, votes required for resolutions
of the board or shareholders; those regarding election of directors and
representative directors; those specifying the powers of the board or
shareholder meetings; and those specifying the points which may be
freely decided in the articles. Articles 239 and 260-2 require a simple
majority of a quorum of half of the issued shareholdings for share-
holders' and directors' resolutions respectively, but significantly, both
articles authorize provisions for larger majorities and quorums in the
articles of incorporation. Article 230-2 then allows the articles of
incorporation to fix matters to be decided by the shareholders in addi-
tion to those specified in the code. There are doubtless some policy
limits to these options, though it is difficult to define the degree of
flexibility permitted. For example, some scholars say that shareholders
may not be authorized to elect the representative director (ordinarily
elected by the board),"°2 and one decision has held that the articles
may not give the president the power to determine the Retirement
10 Suzuy , op. cit. supra note 96, at 4-8; and TANAKA, KAISHAH6 (Company law)
100 (1959).
102 TANAKA, YOSHINAGA & YAMAMURA, op. cit. .supra note 56, at 573-74.
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Allowance (taishokukin) of directors because this is a power reserved
to the shareholders by Commercial Code article 269, unless retirement
matters are fixed in the articles. Thus, delegation to the president in
the articles was deemed inappropriate.'
Election of directors is by the shareholders and cumulative voting
may be provided or prohibited (article 256-4) in the articles of in-
corporation, but even if it is prohibited in the articles, 25 percent or
more of the shareholders may require it by simply filing a request
therefor prior to any given meeting. If cumulative voting is not pro-
hibited in the articles, any shareholder may demand it before an
election (article 256-3). Of course, in U.S.-Japanese joint ventures,
both preemptive rights to new shares and cumulative voting should be
provided in the articles, though as a matter of practice this is seldom
done by purely Japanese corporations. Arithmetic will show what
number of directors must be correlated with the ratio of shareholdings
to get the most out of a minority by cumulative voting.' In general,
the smaller the minority shareholding the larger the board must be
to reflect true voting strength. If more than the minimal three are
desired, a larger number of directors can be fixed by the Articles which
cannot be amended except by a two-thirds' shareholder vote.
Agreements Between the Joint Venturers Committing the Joint
Corporation to Future Specific Policies and Transactions: Most U.S.-
Japanese joint venture contracts envisage future transactions between
the new joint company and one or both of its parents.' These trans-
actions may be critical to the over-all bargain, as for example, transfers
of property such as capital equipment, plant sites, patent licensing,
supplies, agreements, or other arrangements such as sales agencies,
employment of specific personnel, and the like. Drafting responsibility
requires a lawyer to first decide whether such arrangements can, and
if so should, be made binding on the embryo joint corporation or its
promoters, or whether they should be provided only in an initial side
agreement unvalidated by the FIL authorities and binding only between
the joint venturers as future shareholders. To anticipate, ordinarily it
seems that the shareholders' agreement is preferable, although legally
103 Agetsuma v. Kawai, 8 Kakyfi minshii 2139 (Osaka Dist. Ct., Nov. 16, 1957).
104 The procedure and arithmetic of cumulative voting can pose intricate problems,
especially when the legal requirements as to how the voting is to be done are not
specified. See generally Sakai, Ruiseki tohy5 (Cumulative voting), in 3 KABUSHIKI
KAISHAHO KOZA (Lectures on stock corporation law) 1005-28 (1962).
105 GAIKOKU 3OEKI KENKYfiKAI, GAIKOKUJIN NO NIPPON NI OKERU GOBENGAISHA
NO SETSURITSU KEIYAKU NI TSUITE (Concerning contracts to establish foreigners' joint
venture companies in Japan) 14 (1963).
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the new corporation and promoters can be bound by following pre-
scribed procedures at the proper stage. The most important exception
to such a formula is where the FIL requires approval. For example,
all licensing agreements must be approved and in past practice a share
acquisition would not gain validation without a licensing agreement
inducting technology otherwise unavailable to Japan. So the licensing
transaction would have to accompany the application for validation of
the share acquisition, leaving only the question of whether the licenses
(or transfers) of technology may be treated for FIL purposes as
separate transfers to be entered into by the new corporation after
validation and after corporate establishment by the Commercial Code
article 246 adoption (see below). Or, must the licensing be treated
as a concurrent transaction such as a Contribution-in-Kind (gembutsg
sizusshi) under article 168(1)v or property to be taken over later
under article 168 (1)vi, both to be entered in the articles.' Note that
timing is also critical in these problems: (1) first, a joint venture
contract (perhaps with several side agreements, separate, annexed, or
incorporated by reference) is signed; (2) then seven persons (probably
including one or both joint venturers) become promoters by signing
the articles; (3) the constituent shareholders' and directors' meetings
are held at which elections occur and evaluations of contributions are
reviewed; (4) after that, registration is effected, at which time the new
corporation comes into existence and can act on its own.
Generally, there are two ways to proceed in order to transfer the
contemplated obligations arising from these transactions from mere
plans of the joint venturers to commitments of the new corporation.
The commitment to transfer property can either (1) be made by
entering (a) the name of the transferor (subscriber, promoter, or third
'
0 6 COMMEMClAI CODE art. 168(1)v and vi:
The following matters shall not be effective unless they are stated in the articles
of incorporation:
v. The full names of the persons whose contributions are in the form of property
other than money, the property forming the subject-matter of such contributions,
the value of such property, and a statement as to whether shares to be given
therefor are those having par value or those without par value, together with their
classes and their number;
vi. Property which has been stipulated to be taken over after the coming into
existence of the company, its value and the full name of the transferor.
Note these items, amongst others, are known technically as Items of Abnormal
Incorporation (hentai setsuritsu jiko). See generally Imai, Hentai setsuritsu jik6(Items of abnormal incorporation), in 2 S6G6 HANREi KENKYfi s6SHo sH6H6 94(1961). Note that the requirement to list these in the articles brings with it the duty
of passing a court inspection of the transaction before registration of the articles can
be accomplished. CoMaemCI. CODE art. 173(2) in case of Promoter Incorporation
(hokki setsuritsu); arts. 181, 185(1) in case of Public Offering Incorporation (bosha
setsuritsu).
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persons), (b) the property (anything which can be entered on the
balance sheet), and (c) its value in the articles,' before the constituent
meeting;.. or (2) the transaction can be adopted by the new corpora-
tion after it is registered. However, if this latter course is followed,
the contract must be recognized as a new one between the new corpora-
tion and the parent involved, meaning either can actually refuse to
enter into the arrangement. In addition the new corporation can only
enter into such a transaction. 9 by a two-thirds' vote of the share-
holders,"0 and an attempt to adopt the old obligation, without con-
tracting anew, will fail because the old contract is void for lack of
entry in the articles."' It is also useful to remember at this point that
promoters are not competent to act for or to bind the embryo
corporation in any matters looking to the Commencement of Business
(kaigyJ jumbi kdi), as opposed to acts necessary to incorporation." 2
Of course, the thrust of these rules is to prevent evasion of the re-
quirement of similar entries in the articles when a contribution of
property (instead of cash) is to be made for the initial shares of the
corporation,1 ' which contribution-in-kind must be delivered before
107 COMMERCIAL CODE art. 168(1) v and vi.
10 Unreported v. Unreported, 17 (II) HANREI TAIKEI (Compendium of decisions)
(Great Ct. of Cassation, Dec. 24, 1932) (constituent meeting not empowered to accept
a setoff of property of a subscriber in lieu of his obligation to pay cash for shares).
S 1 IsII, SH6H6 (Commercial law) 188 (rev. ed. 1959).
109 COMMERCIAL CODE art. 246:
The provisions of Article 245 paragraph 1 shall apply inutatis mutandis in cases
where, within two years after its coming into existence, a company makes an
agreement to acquire, for value equivalent to not less than one-twentieth of the
capital, property existing prior to its incorporation and intended to be continu-
ously used for purposes of the business.
110 COMMERCIAL CODE art. 245(1) :
A resolution as provided for in Article 343 is required for a company to effect
the following acts:
(1) The transfer of the whole or of an important part of the business of the
company;
(2) The making, alteration or rescission of a contract for leasing the whole of
the business, for giving a mandate to manage such business, or for sharing with
another person the entire profits and losses in relation to the business or of a
similar contract;
(3) The taking over of the whole of the business of any other company.
111Wak6 Seiz6 K~gy6 K.K. v. Maruyama, 7 Minshfi 1299 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 13,
1953), holding against new corporation attempting to defend (against seller's claim of
rescission) old promoter's contract to buy land because corporation adopted the sale
contract by two-thirds' vote provided in COMMERCIAL CODE art. 246. The court held
that a new sales contract could have been so adopted, but not the old one, which was
void for failure to list it in the articles. TANAKA, YOSHINAGA & YAMAMURA, ZENTET
KOMMENTARU KAISHAH6 (Completely revised commentary on company law) 332
(1964).
112 1 IsII, op. cit. supra note 108, at 165; Fuji K6soku Insatsu K.K. v. Tomita,
7 Kakyi! minshii 135 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Jan. 30, 1956) ; also, Unreported v. Unreported,
17 (II) HANREI TAIKEI 94 (Great Ct. of Cassation, Nov. 24, 1924).
1S COMMERCIAL CODE art. 168(1)v. Note that only promoters may contribute
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the corporation can be registered and comes into legal existence. When
either of these types of transfers is planned, the Commercial Code
requires that they be listed in the articles and that a court appoint an
inspector to investigate and report on the propriety of the evaluation
and other aspects of the transaction. If improprieties are found,
changes may be ordered by the constituent meeting"' or the court,115
depending on which of the two available incorporation procedures is
being followed." 6 All of these are, of course, to protect the subscribers
and the public from depletion of assets by inside deals. The provision
allowing post-incorporation transfers, so long as they were listed in
the articles and inspected by the court, was enacted as late as 1938
after a decision that unlisted transfers were void.' 7
A review of these rules is especially pertinent to a joint venture
because the parties often want to transfer intangible industrial property
or capital equipment to the new corporation and difficulties, real or
imagined, of proving its value and delivery have motivated the parties
to avoid the court inspections during incorporation where legally possi-
ble, even though they submit technology transfers for FIL approval.
So, for corporate law purposes, instead of a direct single transaction
whereby a contribution-in-kind of patents, know-how, etc., is trans-
ferred for shares, they arrange to pay cash for the shares (without
mention of the property transfer contemplated later), and after in-
corporation the shareholder receives his money back in exchange for
his patents, etc. This kind of prearrangement is entirely void against
the joint corporation. Also, whether the technology is to be a contri-
bution-in-kind or transferred after incorporation, it requires FIL
approval, and can involve some of the most difficult tax problems as
well.
Leaving these latter problems aside, such a result may not be so
disadvantageous to suggest listing the transaction in the articles,
because if the joint venturers are bound contractually to cause the new
company to act in accordance with the plan, there should be little
property for shares, but this is a restriction on initial share issues at the time of
establishment. Property instead of cash may be exchanged for shares in subsequent
issues after incorporation by any one where agreeable to the directors, and no court
inspection is required. CoMMERcIAL CODE art. 280-2(1). So the technique of a later
share issue, if agreed in a side agreement, would avoid the court inspection procedures
but not the FIL scrutiny, of course.
"14 COMMERCIAL CODE art. 185 (1).
115 COMMERCIAL CODE art. 173 (2).
116 See note 106 supra.
3.7 Shirai v. K.K. Daiei Marugumi, 12 Minshii 2861, 2866 (Great Ct. of Cassation,
Dec. 18, 1933).
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difficulty in obtaining the new corporation's acceptance of a new
contract to transfer the property by the two-thirds' vote required.
Should the majority shareholder fail to carry through, surely the
venture will fail anyway, and for salvage operations a claim against
the other joint venturer for damages, especially if liquidated damages
are specified, is as good as any remedy against the ineffectual new
corporation. However, for maximum security the other party must
be made to specifically undertake to cause the new corporation to do
as stipulated or compensate the other party for the loss. In summary
then, it seems that because of the formalisms of the kabushiki kaisha
law, it is preferable in most of these matters (except licenses of tech-
nology which need FIL approval) to rely on side agreements between
prospective shareholders for legal commitments of a specific nature
such as transfers of property to the new corporation. Of course, for
guarantees of corporate positions or employment contracts and the
like, there is no alternative because they cannot be put into the
articles legally.
Joint Venture Corporation's Third Party Beneficiary Rights: From
the joint company's point of view, it could be important to know what
right the new corporation has in Japanese law to accept and enforce
the benefits conferred upon it by the side contract of the parents.
Again, consistent with general Japanese theory, one might suppose
that the contract should be enforceable despite the corporate law
stricture since the Civil Code recognizes the right of a third party
beneficiary,'18 even though the third party may be a corporation not
yet in existence at the time of contracting." 9 But the right is only
perfected when the beneficiary notifies the obligor of his acceptance
of the benefit and obligation.'
It has been demonstrated, however, that in one case' 2 ' the court
118 CIVIL CODE art. 537:
1. Where a party to a contract has agreed therein to effect an act or performance
in favor of a third person, such third person is entitled to demand such act of per-
formance directly to the obligor.
2. In the case mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the right of the third
person shall come into existence as from the time when he declares to the obligor
his intention to accept the benefit of the contract.
119 Osaka Seiki K.K. v. Nakata, 9 Minroku 299 (Great Ct. of Cassation, Mar. 10,
1903) (enforcing a contract against a third-party beneficiary incorporated after the
contract) Matsuyama v. Matsuo, 24 Minroku 2131 (Great Ct. of Cassation, Nov. 5,
1918) (unborn third-party beneficiary).
120 See Nagase v. Matsuda, 20 Minroku 313 (Great Ct. of Cassation, April 22,
1914), holding that the contract is binding between the original parties, whether or not
the third-party beneficiary elects to accept the contract.
121 See note 111 supra. Wak6 Seiz6 K6gy6 K.K. v. Maruyama, 7 Minshfi 1299
(Sup. Ct., Dec. 13, 1953).
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held that the contract for transfer of land, concluded between a pro-
moter and the seller for benefit of an embryo corporation but not
listed in the articles, was void and the third party new corporation
could not, after incorporation, accept the benefits and enforce the
contract against the seller even by compliance with Commercial Code
article 246 (two-thirds' vote). Doubtless, the holding in this case is
understandable as an example where, as in U.S. law, a contract is not
enforceable when the state specifically forbids that the corporation
be bound as a party by such contract itself without conforming to the
prescribed procedures, which is apparently the effect of article
168(1)vi.2
There are, however, other types of obligations such as employment
and advisory services which the joint venturers undertake for the new
corporation as third-party beneficiary which cannot and need not be
entered into the articles because they involve no property transfer.
With respect to these arrangements, the joint corporation as a third-
party beneficiary would have a right to accept the benefit, and duty
if any, and could enforce the contract directly against the obligor
parent.
FRUSTRATION AND MODIFICATION
We have emphasized throughout that, whatever the legalities of the
situation may be, a court cannot in fact affirmatively enforce the con-
tinued confidence and cooperation required for the success of a close
corporate operation any more than it could in a marriage. These
relationships depend for continuance of effective operations almost
entirely on confidence born of mutual interest and understanding. In
what then is essentially private law-enforcing as well as private law-
making, legal obligations, if clearly understood by the parties to be
such, may have functional preventive and deterrent value; or in case
of failure of the enterprise, they may be legally useful in the litigious
sense in salvaging some pieces. But, the law will rarely put together
what the parties have put asunder, and the wise lawyer, like the wise
bamboo, will bend with the wind and use his skills to induce initial
mutuality and clarity of legal commitment-only theoretically enforce-
122 If on the facts it is to the advantage of the new corporation to accept the benefit
of the contract, as was the situation in the Wak6 case (apparently the value of the
land had gone up from 1944 to 1953 far beyond the contract price), then it seems the
court should give effect to the overriding policy of upholding the bargain of the
parties. In the Wak6 case there were, however, added considerations, e.g., the new
corporation did not pay the price in time and seller had opted to rescind.
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able-for whatever value of the sort mentioned above it may turn
out to have.
But even though the original bargain seems clear enough, both
between the parties and in law, there is the additional problem, par-
ticularly relevant to a minority position, of subsequent coerced modifi-
cations ---a danger which a majority may be peculiarly able to exploit
in a joint venture where the bullied minority knows full well that
success is dependent on continued cooperation and that legal remedies
to that end are ineffectual. An analogous situation in our law is the
position of a contractor, in the middle, confronted with demands for a
higher price by a subcontractor." 4
There are three Japanese factors-one, a matter of Japanese business
practice, the other two, legal points which bear on the potential problem
of coerced modification of U.S.-Japanese joint venture agreements and
which a draftsman needs to bear in mind. First, we have noted that
Japanese businessmen, unlike Americans, do not habitually use formal
detailed contracts drafted with a view to enforcement by litigation in
their domestic business relations;125 they traditionally have preferred
flexibility in their hierarchical relationships to meet problems as they
unfold and preferred socal power and conciliation to resolve disputes.
In their domestic society, uniquely organized both in degree and kind,
that approach seems to work well enough. But an awkward foreigner
can hardly "while in Japan do as the Japanese ethnocentrically and
particularistically do,' 26 and a foreign minority position is thus un-
tenable, unless the basic bargain is faithfully observed in accordance
with the universalistic codes and unless the terms of the bargain are
observed without unwarranted requests for changes or subsequent re-
negotiation.
123 See Corbin, Does a Pre-existing Duty Defeat Consideration?, 27 YALE L.J. 362,
373-79 (1918). Dalzell, Duress by Economic Pressure, 20 N.C.L. REv. 237 (1942) ;
Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L. REV. 253 (1947).
See, e.g., United States v. I. B. Miller, Inc., 81 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1936) ; 1 CORBIN,
CONTRACTS § 171 (1950).
124 E.g., Healy v. Brewster, 30 Cal. Reptr. 129, 380 P2d 817 (1963) ; Note, 51
CALIF. L. REv. 1001 (1963).
125 See note 11 supra. Note that Europeans also are said to use formal contracts
much less than Americans. Van Hecke, A Civilian Looks at the Conmmon-Law
Lawyer, in PARKER SCHOOL, INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 5 (Reese ed. 1962).
126 There are no careful behavioral studies, but there are occasional journalistic
comments critical of Japanese attitudes toward contracts with foreigners. E.g., U.S.
News and World Report, May 18, 1964, p. 104; Themes and Variations, Wall Street
Journal, Feb. 3, 1964; and DE MENTE, JAPANESE MANNERS AND ETHICS IN BUSINESS
(1960); and DE MENTE, How BUSINESS Is DONE IN JAPAN (1963). Comments in
these latter books are sometimes extreme, but doubtless express the feeling and
misunderstanding of some foreigners dealing with Japan, and they are cited here for
evidence of those attitudes of foreigners.
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Novation (kokai) is, of course, provided for in the Japanese Civil
Code, and it presents no special legal problems here, requiring as it
does the agreement of both parties.12 It is significant in this discussion
of security for contractual commitments to a minority interest to note,
however, that in Japanese law a later promise by one party to do more
than the signed contract calls for, based for example on threats of non-
performance by the other and without any change in the other's obliga-
tions, is binding,12 even though the subsequent promise is oral and,
in our usual conception, without consideration. 2 '
In avoiding erosion of the initial bargain, it is, therefore, important
to know when a request for modification has some legal support; for
example, what sort of changed circumstances will excuse nonperform-
ance. Impossibility is, of course, recognized as an excuse for nonper-
formance, and, as a general rule, the risk of loss is on the obligor,"'
127 CIVIL CODE arts. 513-18. Article 513 reads:
1. If the parties have entered into a contract in which the essential elements of
the obligation are modified, such obligation shall be extinguished by novation.
2. The removal, addition, or alteration of conditions shall be deemed to be a
modification of the essential elements of the obligation. The same shall apply
where a bill of exchange is issued in lieu of the performance.
128 Ogoshi v. Tokyo Tatemono, 22 Minroku 1845 (Great Ct. of Cassation, Oct. 4,
1916) (no "consideration" but change in rent upheld); Unreported v. Unreported,
H6ritsu shimbun (No. 2055) 17 (Tokyo Appellate Chamber, July 21, 1922); Un-
reported v. Unreported, 11 (II) HANrEI TAIXEI (Compendium of decisions) 1137,
HANPE TIMES (No. 30) 34 (1953) (Sup. Ct., March 20, 1953) (no "consideration"
but change of price for immovables upheld); see cases cited in 13 (III) HANREI
TAIKEi 312. Note the interesting emphasis of the foregoing cases on novation. The
discussion centers around the problem of whether a subsequent promise to pay more
without any change in the other's performance was a change in the "essential ele-
ments" of the obligation in each case which would extinguish the prior contract by
novation (per art. 513; see note 127 supra). At common law such a subsequent
"novation" would doubtless fail for lack of consideration, leaving the original contract
the same. See Ames, Two Theories of Consideration, 12 HAv. L. REv. 515, 521(1899). But in the Ogoshi case, supra, where a surety was defending by arguing that
a novation took place without his consent, thus superseding all the old contracts, the
court held that the price change was not a change of an "essential element" required for
novation which would extinguish the prior contract; so the court held the surety
liable on the subsisting old contract.
For the German and French approach see, von Mehren, Civil Law Analogies to
Consideration: An Exercise in Comparative Analysis, 72 HARv. L. Ray. 1009 (1959) ;
Keyes, Cause and Consideration in California-A Reappraisal, 47 CALIF. L. REv. 74(1959) ; and Smith, A Refresher Course in Cause, 12 LA. L. REv. 2 (1951).
129 For discussion of various aspects of the problem, see Corbin, supra note 123, and
Note, supra note 124; cf. Note, 2 HousToN L. REV. 132 (1964).
130 CIVIL CODE art. 536:
1. Except in the cases mentioned in the preceding two Articles, if the perform-
ance of an obligation becomes impossible by any cause for which neither of the
parties is responsible, the obligor is not entitled to counter-performance.
2. If performance becomes impossible by any cause for which the obligee is
responsible, the obligor shall not lose his right to demand counter-performance;
however, if he has received any benefit through being relieved of his own obliga-
tion, he shall return such benefit to the obligee.
The text alone is confusing on the point because it only provides that the obligor is
not entitled to counter-performance without saying he is excused from performance
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with the exception of sales of identified specific goods where the risk
is shifted to the purchaser even before payment and delivery. 1'
The Doctrine on Change of Circumstance (jijj henki no gensoku)
is more closely related to our inquiry here. 2 As exemplified in the
Japanese precedents, it is a far different thing from a flexible contract
to allow adjustments for inconvenient contingencies. In a leading case,
Iguchi v. Ikegami, the Supreme Court while refusing to recognize a
defense of changed circumstances laid down four criteria which seem
to be generally accepted law:.33
1. Substantial change of circumstances must have occurred since
the contract was formed.
2. The changes must have been unforeseeable.
3. The change must have been caused by forces for which neither
party was responsible.
4. And, thus, to enforce the contract would violate the Principle
of Faith and Trust (shingi seijitsu no gensoku).
The code basis for this doctrine is Civil Code article 1(2) . . requiring
that rights be exercised faithfully and in accordance with the principles
of trust. The weight of scholarly opinion says that an objective, unfore-
seeable change for which the parties were not responsible must be found
first; then the situation is examined to see whether the parties' own
positions and actions warrant excuse of performance under article
(i.e., need not pay damages to the obligee). But the article is interpreted to have the
effect attributed to it above. 5(1) WAGATSUMA, MIMP6 K6GI (Lectures on the Civil
Code) 99-112 (1962). Unreported v. Unreported, 12(I) HANREI TAIKEI (Compen-
dium of decisions) 482 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Dec. 8, 1928), where a seller of a business
which was later destroyed in the 1923 earthquake before delivery, was held not entitled
to the price from the buyer.
131 CIVIL CODE arts. 534-36. See criticism of article 534 in 5(1) WAGATSUMA, op.
cit. supra note 130, at 85, 102 (1962) ; for a practical discussion of this problem, see
BOEKI TO 11ORITSU (Trade and law) 352-79 (8 B6EKI JITSUMU KOZA (Lectures on
trade practice) ed. (1962).
132 See generally 5(1) WAGATSUMA, op. cit. supra note 130, at 28 (1962) ; Fukuji,
Jijo henka no gensoku (Principle of changed circumstances), in 3 MIMP6 ENSHfu
(Seminar on the Civil Code) 65 (Taniguchi & Kat6 ed. 1958).
This doctrine is similar to frustration in our law. See B6EKI To HoRITSU, op. cit.
supra note 132, at 331-34. Compare RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 288 (1932). See gen-
erally Berman, Excuse for Nonperformance in the Light of Contract Practices in Inter-
national Trade, 63 COLUm. L. REv. 1413 (1963); Smit, Frustration of Contract: A
Comparative Attempt at Consolidation, 58 COLUm. L. REV. 287 (1958) ; Anderson,
Frustration of Contract-A Rejected Doctrine, 3 DE PAUL L. REv. 1 (1953) ; Drachler,
Frustration of Contract: Comparative Law Aspects of Remedies in Cases of Super-
vening Illegality, 3 N.Y.L.F. 50 (1957).
133 Iguchi v. Ikegami, 8 Minshii 449, 459 (Sup. Ct, Feb. 12, 1954) (compromise
agreement upheld against defense of change of circumstances).
134 CIVIL CODE art. 1 (2) : "The exercise of rights and performance of duties shall
be done in faith and in accordance with the principles of trust."
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1(2). 111 The cases have been very strict in the postwar period, 3' and
it is safe to assume that argument for a change in contractual terms on
this basis will have to be supported by real hardship without fault and
caused by extreme and unforeseeable changes of circumstance after the
contract was made.
In summary, Japanese substantive law as administered by the courts
furnishes ample security against claims for modifications merely con-
venient for one side. Also, for a Japanese operation, the draftsman
does not need an elaborately tailored force majeure clause, at least
from the minority point of view. Nonetheless, Japanese parties oc-
casionally wish to insert a clause to the effect that in case of changed
conditions or disagreement, the parties will discuss the matter and
reach an amicable agreement. In this innocuous sounding suggestion is
often planted the seeds of traditional flexibility which may come to be
understood as a right to change. In the interest of security of the
commitments, it is advisable to discuss these matters thoroughly and
to leave such clauses out, especially since legally the parties can always
agree to a partially or wholly new arrangement.
CONCLUSION
Experienced international practitioners will know that the role of
law and the efficacy of courts vary from place to place, and that,
consequently perhaps, businessmen choose to give formal contracts a
role which varies with the country. Compared to us, Japanese rely little
on formal contracts domestically, and they rely even less on litigation.
This point of behavior regarding the uses of contract law and the role
of law generally needs to be understood, even though increased inter-
national business contacts are focussing more attention on their positive
law.
Additionally, it is common sense that the legal meaning of a U.S.-
Japanese contract in the Holmesian sense (the law is what the court
says it is) cannot be understood prospectively unless we know from
which law it derives its meaning. And we cannot, in fact, determine
which law would govern in litigation for sure, until we know where a
suit will be brought, which in turn is indeterminable so long as the
135 5(1) WAGATSUMA, op. cit. mipra note 130, at 27; M. KATsumoTo, MMr5
xENKY (Study of the Civil Code) 41 (1934).1 3 6 lguchi v. Ikegami, 8 Minsh_ 448 (Sup. Ct, Feb. 12, 1954); Taiy6 Tochi K.K. v.
Ofuruta, 9 Minshi 2027 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 20, 1955); Iwanari v. Kurihara, 10 Minshii
342 (Sup. Ct, April 5, 1956) ; Masuda v. Higuchi, 10 MinshOi 566 (Sup. Ct, May 25,
1956). All four of these cases refused to accept a defense of changed circumstances to
excuse performance.
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parties can sue in more than one country-and they can-considering
both of them separately as potential plaintiffs. When our federalistic
complex is introduced into any bilateral problem with some states
showing little or no respect for foreign judgments, prorogation, and
choice-of-law clauses, the single law standard for understanding the
legal meaning of a contract as an enforceable instrument, prospectively,
is largely illusory at the only point where the law can add anything
more to the security of the transaction than the parties' good faith-
namely in a lawsuit.
In U.S.-Japanese joint ventures nearly all American firms have a
minority position because of Japanese official policy against foreign
majority equities in Japanese enterprises. This fact molds the consti-
tutive contracts in a fairly fixed pattern, and by all odds the most
important problem is to protect the minority interest within the limits
possible under the Japanese contract, administrative, and corporation
laws. We find that it is possible to restrict the transfer of shares by
contract valid between the parties, but that no enforcement is possible
against the corporation or third parties and although specific perform-
ance is available in the law, it is in fact unlikely to be useful against the
other party. Damage claims are similarly ineffectual unless liquidated
damages are included in the contract; if they are, they will be upheld
unless they are so excessive as to be contra bonos mores, which is a
standard apparently much more permissive than our penalty.
A minority veto power over certain critical transactions is given in
the Commercial Code itself to the shareholder with more than one third
of the votes, and the veto can be extended legally in the articles to other
transactions. Higher votes can be provided in the articles, but ulti-
mately small minorities cannot be so protected because the articles can
be amended by a two-thirds' vote and this required vote cannot be
made larger by the parties in the articles. To protect a veto power,
it is necessary to provide for preemptive rights for the existent share-
holder in the articles. The veto power can be extended to the board
by properly calculating the number of directors and providing for
cumulative voting in the articles plus adequate extraordinary board
votes in the articles; even more than two-thirds could apparently be
required.
Prospective commitments for later property transfers between the
parents and the joint corporation can be made effective against the new
corporation only by including them in the articles and by getting a
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court inspector's approval at the time of incorporation. Often it would
be reasonably safe and much simpler to bind the other joint venturer,
on the risk of otherwise paying liquidated damages, to cause the new
corporation to enter a new contract and to approve the transfer by a
two-thirds' shareholder vote required for certain transfers within two
years after incorporation. Where transactions other than property
transfers are contemplated for the future company, they can only be
fixed as legal obligation between the joint venturers, but the Japanese
law provides benefits for the third party new corporation.
The conclusion which comes through more clearly is that without
good faith cooperation, no affirmative legal remedy is adequate to make
a joint venture work. Nevertheless, a well-planned legal structure set
up and operating will make the bargain understandable, operable, and
then, given the modicum of initial good faith, sustainable. Careful
legal planning will also help salvage something from a stalemate.
Liquidated damage clauses are as useful in a breakdown as they are
difficult to negotiate.
